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Outsourcing is a commonly used method for providing cost savings in business 
and the Federal Government.  This project begins by providing background on the 
history, goals, and problems associated with the A-76 process.  It will then analyze the 
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supply squadrons to determine whether anticipated cost savings were achieved.  Any 
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expectations.  If added costs came up throughout the life of the contract, the causes of 
these will be sought and determination made whether or not they could have been 
anticipated in the initial contract competition and used in the initial cost comparison.   
Furthermore, this research lays a foundation for building a body of knowledge to 
be utilized in future research regarding the federal A-76 or competitive sourcing practices 
and procedures, from which overarching conclusions of federal outsourcing can be drawn 
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Since the creation of more efficient organizations results in cost reductions, 
competitive sourcing is increasingly viewed as a way to reduce overhead costs and 
capture savings.  This paper explains why outsourcing is used and provides an overview 
of the current process used to outsource government operations, which is outlined in the 
Office of Management and Budget A-76 Circular.  It discusses the various risks 
associated with outsourcing and some of the problems with the cost estimates used by the 
government to determine cost savings.  This paper discusses the FAIR Act and the 
President’s Management Agenda and the impact that they have had on government 
outsourcing, problems the government has experienced in their outsourcing competitions, 
and proposed alternatives to the current A-76 process.  
In addition, this paper examines an outsourcing of a supply squadron at an Air 
Force base.  Data was collected and pre-outsourcing actual costs, estimated costs to keep 
the function in-house, anticipated contractual costs, and actual contractual costs were 
compared to determine if the anticipated cost savings were realized.  Analysis of the 
outsourcing competition and the resulting contract was completed to determine if any 
deficiencies existed that may have contributed to the outcome.   
The authors’ findings are that outsourcing usually does create cost savings in the 
short run, although hidden and overlooked costs make these savings substantially lower 
than expected.  Cost savings are less likely to exist in the long run.  They also find that 
more consideration should be given to the risks of outsourcing before new competitions 
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I. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Outsourcing is a commonly used method for providing cost savings in business 
and the Federal Government.  The current process for government outsourcing is outlined 
in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and is commonly 
referred to as the A-76 process.  In 2001, a particular Air Force Base, as part of a larger 
Air Force supply reconfiguration, completed the process for outsourcing the operations of 
the supply squadron.  The contract that was let as part of this competition expired at the 
end of the 2005 fiscal year.  With the entire life of the contract available for analysis, 
along with all of the material of the preceding A-76 process, an objective investigation 
can be made to determine whether the Air Force achieved the cost savings it anticipated. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the financial management aspects of the 
Air Force’s decision to outsource this particular supply squadron in order to determine 
whether cost savings were achieved.  Any costs savings or increases will be analyzed to 
determine to what extent they exceeded expectations.  If added costs came up throughout 
the life of the contract, the causes of these will be sought and determination made 
whether or not they could have been anticipated in the initial contract competition and 
used in the initial cost comparison.  Furthermore, this research will lay a foundation for 
building a body of knowledge to be utilized for future research regarding the federal A-76 
or competitive sourcing practices and procedures, from which conclusions about federal 
outsourcing can be drawn about the strengths and weaknesses of the procedures currently 
utilized. 
C. SCOPE 
This research will look at one particular outsourcing action that took place in the 
Air Force.  The data provided includes documents from the pre-outsourcing period, the 
period of performance for the contract awarded, and historical data summarizing the 
period of time the contract was in effect.  The particular supply squadron being analyzed 
should provide a fair representation of outsourcing actions accomplished by the Air Force 
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between 1998 and 2001.  According to data provided to us by the particular base to which 
this squadron was assigned, it was one of 12 supply squadrons that underwent 
outsourcing actions via the A-76 guidelines between these years and was the third largest 
organization considered.  This squadron was also competed later in the period (2001), 
along with three other squadrons, which should have provided the opportunity for lessons 
learned from previous competitions to be incorporated into a higher quality outcome than 
its predecessors.    
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the creation of more efficient organizations results in cost reductions1, 
competitive sourcing is increasingly viewed as a way to reduce overhead costs and 
capture savings2.  Current literature states that these cost savings are often achieved 
regardless of whether the government or the commercial sector wins the competition3.  
This leads to the primary research question of: Did the outsourcing of a particular Air 
Force supply squadron’s operations achieve the anticipated cost savings?  Answering this 
question provides insight, after the full completion of a total outsourcing process, of the 
overall value of outsourcing activities within the federal government in order to 
maximize the effective use of limited tax dollars.  More specifically, the answer to this 
question will be approached by looking at the actual costs incurred over the life of the 
outsourced contract and compared to the costs incurred prior to the outsourcing process.  
In addition, the actual costs incurred will be compared to the costs that may have been 
reasonably assumed to have been incurred if the contract was simply kept as-is and kept 
up with inflation during this period of time.  Finally, a look at the estimated cost of the 
outsourced contract will be compared against the actual cost incurred over the period. 
The primary research question will be approached by laying a foundation of the 
actions involved in the government outsourcing process, along with drawbacks and 
                                                 
1 United States General Accounting Office. DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on 
Federal Employees' Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2001. 
2 Susan M. Gates and Albert A. Robbert. Personnel Savings in Competitively Sourced DoD Activities: 
Are they Real? Will they Last?. RAND, 2000. 
3 United States General Accounting Office. DOD Competitive Sourcing: Savings are Occurring, but 
Actions are Needed to Improve Accuracy of Savings Estimates, 2000. 
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benefits of the process discovered by others.  Next, an explanation of where and how data 
was obtained will be given in concert with how it will be analyzed to help draw 
conclusions for answering the research question.  Actual analysis of the information and 
data will then occur and provide the basis for conclusions and recommendations for 
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II. HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF OUTSOURCING POLICY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
1. Overview of Outsourcing 
At over $2.7 trillion4, a one-percent reduction in costs would reduce the United 
States federal budget by over $27 billion per year.  To put this in context, these savings 
are roughly equal to the combined annual gross domestic products (GDPs) of North 
Korea and Mongolia5.  To say the least, numbers of this magnitude provide a great 
opportunity for cost savings. 
 Outsourcing is one initiative used by the government to augment its capabilities 
and reduce its costs.  Outsourcing is not a new idea.  In fact, it has been around since the 
earliest days of our country when George Washington used contractors to support his 
troops during the American Revolutionary War6.  Since then, the government has 
increasingly relied on the private sector to provide needed goods.  Today the government 
produces very few of its own goods and relies almost exclusively on the private sector.  
However, it is only in the past half century that the government has made substantial 
efforts to outsource more of its service functions.   
An official definition of outsourcing was provided in 1996 by the Defense 
Science Board’s Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization.  They stated that: 
Outsourcing often refers to the transfer of a support function traditionally 
performed by an in-house organization to an outside service provider.  
Outsourcing occurs in both public and private sectors.  While the 
outsourcing firm or government organization continues to provide 
appropriate oversight, the vendor is typically granted a degree of 
flexibility regarding how the work is performed.  In successful 




                                                 
4 Office of Management and Budget. Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2007, 2007. 
5 CIA World Fact Book. “GDP 2003.” 2003. 
<http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/rankings/gdp_2003_0.html>.  Website last accessed August, 2006. 
6 Michael R. Rampy. “Paradox Or Paradigm? Operational Contractor Support.” Military Review. 
May-June (2005) 
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business practices to improve service delivery and/or reduce support costs.  
Vendors are usually selected as the result of competition among qualified 
bidders7.   
 
 In other words, outsourcing is a decision by the government to purchase goods 
and services from sources outside of the affected government agency8.  At its core, 
outsourcing is a make-versus-buy decision.  When the government is considering 
outsourcing a function, it engages in a process known as competitive sourcing.  In this 
process, the government agency proposes a re-organization of its unit into a Most 
Efficient Organization (MEO).  The proposed MEO then competes against other agencies 
and the private sector.  If the MEO can provide the good or service at a lower cost than 
the private sector or another government agency, it retains the function in-house.  If it 
cannot do so, the function is outsourced9.    
2. Overview of OMB Circular A-76 
 The current process for competitive sourcing is outlined in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, which provides “an analytical 
framework on which the government bases a decision on who can best provide the 
products and services it needs”10.   
 The goals of the A-76 process are defined by the following three fundamental 
principles: 
1. Achieve economy and enhance productivity; 
2. Keep inherently governmental functions “in-house”; 
                                                 
7 United States Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization, and United 
States Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. Report of the Defense 
Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization. Washington, D.C: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1996. 
8 Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005.  
9Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California. 
10 T.F. Dedman. Memorandum for all Naval Postgraduate Civilian Employees: Commercial-Industrial 
Program Studies, 1979. 
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3. Rely on the commercial sector for products and services if determined 
economical11. 
 Furthermore, the policy rests on four assumptions: 
1. The federal government should not compete against its citizens, but rely 
on the commercial sector to supply products and services needed by the 
government;  
2. The government can conduct cost comparison studies to determine “who 
best to do the work” through a process of “managed competitions”; 
3. Market forces can determine the most effective and cost-efficient methods 
to operate functions in both government and commercial sectors; 
4. The nature of competition within the marketplace can be “self-managed” 
and not require government oversight12. 
As was mentioned in the second A-76 fundamental principle, the government is 
required to keep inherently governmental functions in-house.  It should be noted that 
there are multiple definitions of inherently governmental.  The A-76 Circular defines an 
inherently governmental function as one that “requires either the exercise of substantial 
discretion in applying government authority or the making of value judgments in making 
decisions for the government”13.   
Section 5 of P.L. 105-270, 31 U.S.C. 501 note (1998) defines an inherently 
governmental function as a “function that is so intimately related to the public interest as 
to require performance by Federal Government employees”14. 
Regardless of the exact definition used, inherently governmental functions are not 
subject to outsourcing under the A-76 process. 
3. History of A-76 
 Although outsourcing had been used by the federal government since its earliest 
days, it only began receiving significant attention in the mid-1950s when the Eisenhower 
                                                 
11 Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California. 
12 Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
13 Office of Management and Budget. Circular no. A-76, 1999. 
14 31 United States Code 501 Pub. L. 105-270. Federal Activities Inventory Reform, 1998.  
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administration encouraged federal agencies to obtain commercially available goods and 
services from the private sector whenever it was cost-effective15.  
Eisenhower’s direction led to the creation of the Commercial-Industrial Studies 
Program, which developed procedures and guidelines for outsourcing that would result in 
cost savings while still obtaining the correct support16.  The resulting policy stated that 
“Federal agencies will not provide a function in-house that is obtainable from a private 
source unless Government performance of that function has been justified in the national 
interest”17. 
In 1955, the predecessor to the A-76 Circular, Budget Bulletin 55-4, was issued.  
The Budget Bulletin stated, “It is the general policy of the Federal Government that it 
will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its 
own use if such a product or service can be procured from private enterprise through 
ordinary business channels”18.   
Budget Bulletin 55-4 was replaced by the OMB A-76 Circular in 1966.  A year 
later, in 1967, the Circular underwent its first revision when formal guidelines for cost 
comparison procedures were added19.  In 1979 the Circular was revised a second time to 
better define whether an agency had a requirement to contract out non-inherently 
governmental functions20. 
                                                 
15 United States General Accounting Office. DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on 
Federal Employees' Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2001. 
16 Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California.  
17 T.F. Dedman. Memorandum for all Naval Postgraduate Civilian Employees: Commercial-Industrial 
Program Studies, 1979. 
18 United States Department of Defense. Defense Reform Initiative Report, 1997.  
19 Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California. 
20 Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California. 
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When President Reagan was elected to office, his administration emphasized the 
view that big government was inefficient, wasteful, and unmanageable21.  In 1981 they 
directed a thorough analysis of the A-76 process, which took two years to complete.  
After the review was completed in 1983, OMB updated the Circular and set procedures in 
place to reestablish the initial objective of the Eisenhower administration.  In particular, 
the revision clarified procedures and streamlined the evaluation process for outsourcing 
determinations22.    
Administrative and legislative constraints from the late 1980s through the early 
1990s resulted in a lull, and even a short moratorium, of outsourcing competitions23.  
This began to change with the creation of the Clinton administration’s National 
Performance Review (NPR) on 3 March 1993.  The NPR focused on transitioning from a 
government that “works better and costs less” to a government that “works better and 
does less”24, and promoted the idea that the government should focus its attention on 
those activities which it should and could do best and then place incentives in place to 
ensure optimum results25.  The recommendations of the NPR served as an impetus for the 
executive branch to propose new procurement reform in the following years26.   
In 1995, congressional and administration initiatives placed more emphasis on A-
76 competitions as a means to achieve greater economies and efficiencies in operations27.  
That same year, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the services to make 
                                                 
21 Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
22 Thomas J. Moreau. The Evaluation of Appropriateness of OMB Circular A-76 Studies on Revenue-
Generating Functions in Defense Working Capital Fund Activities. Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. 
Monterey, California. 
23 United States General Accounting Office. DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of A-76 Studies 
Over the Past 5 Years: Report to Congressional Committees. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2000. 
24 Office of the Vice President. Serving the American Public: Best Practices in Downsizing, Bench-
Marking Study Report, 1997.  
25 Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
26 Office of the Vice President. From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better 
and Costs Less, 1998. 
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outsourcing of support activities a priority, and the effort subsequently was incorporated 
as a major initiative under the Secretary’s 1997 Defense Reform Initiative28. 
In 1996, the A-76 Circular underwent its fourth revision.  The revision further 
clarified procedures for determining whether recurring commercial activities should be 
outsourced, balanced the interests of the parties in make-or-buy cost comparisons, 
provided a level playing field between public and private competitors, and encouraged 
competition and choice in the management and performance of commercial activities29. 
The Circular was revised a fifth time in 1999.  This revision stated that the 
government may engage in inherently commercial activities if it can be determined that 
the function is critical to combat effectiveness or the mission effectiveness will suffer 
because of outsourcing, a commercial source is not available or cannot provide the 
product or service to meet government requirements in a timely manner, another Federal 
agency cannot provide the goods or services, or procuring from commercial firms will 
result in a higher cost to the government than if the item is produced internally30. 
The 1999 revision also implemented the statutory requirements of the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, which required that the head of each executive 
agency submit to the Director of OMB and Congress a list of activities performed by 
Federal Government sources for the executive agency, which in their opinion were not 
inherently governmental31.  The FAIR Act will be discussed further in Section E of this 
chapter.  
In 2001, President Bush’s “President’s Management Agenda” (PMA), which will 
also be discussed further in Section E of this chapter, identified competitive sourcing as 
one of five management initiatives designed to enhance government effectiveness32.  It 
also led to another two-year study of the A-76 process. 
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32 Office of Management and Budget. The President's Management Agenda for FY2002, 2001. 
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In 2003, the newest A-76 revision was completed.  The revision did away with the 
two-step process in which industry first competes in a “best value competition” among 
other industry hopefuls, and then competes in a “cost comparison competition” with the 
government.  Now there is a single competition, with the government MEO generally 
being treated as if it were another commercial bidder33. The revision also added guidance 
governing conflicts of interest. 
According to the Commercial Activities Panel, the group chiefly responsible for 
many of the recent changes, the “new Circular permits a greater reliance on procedures 
contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, and should result in a more transparent, 
simpler, and consistently applied process”34.  At this point, it is still too early to know 
what impact this newest revision will have on government outsourcing.  
B. REASONS FOR OUTSOURCING 
1. Introduction 
 To this point, we have discussed outsourcing and the A-76 process from the broad 
perspective of the government as a whole.  Now we will narrow our focus to the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  There have been many reasons offered for why the DoD 
is focusing so much of its attention towards outsourcing.  In the end, they can be summed 
up into three reasons: move military members into warfighting positions, create more 
efficient and better performing organizations, and reduce costs. 
2. Warfighting 
The military services have been actively reviewing which military positions may 
be replaced by civilian or contractor personnel.  By replacing military personnel with 
civilian or contractor personnel, especially in commercial-type functions, the services are 
able to reassign these personnel to operational areas where shortages of military 
                                                 
33 Brett Stevens. An Analysis of Industry's Perspective on the Recent Changes to Circular A-76. 
Monterey, California: Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 
Monterey, California.  
34 United States General Accounting Office. Competitive Sourcing: Implementation Will be 
Challenging for Federal Agencies, 2003. 
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personnel exist35.  In other words, the services are trying to move as many military 
personnel as possible from support to warfighting roles.   
 The reason for this is simple.  During the George H.W. Bush and Clinton 
administrations, the military was downsized by one-third36.  With current operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and a sustained military presence in Korea and other locations 
around the globe, there is a shortage of military personnel. 
 Rather than rebuild the military to a level where it can execute the Global War on 
Terrorism by itself, the current Bush administration has decided instead to outsource 
many of the jobs that used to be performed by military personnel37.  For almost a decade, 
the military has been shifting supply and support personnel into combat jobs and hiring 
defense contractors to do the rest.  As a result, the number of contract civilians 
performing work the military used to do has increased tenfold over this period38.  
 The DoD’s increased reliance on contractor support in part led to a 1997 report 
from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) which concluded that contractors have 
become a critical force multiplier in many missions because of troop ceilings, unavailable 
host-nation support, and the operational requirement to keep military units available to 
respond to major regional conflicts39. 
3. More Efficient and Better Performing Organizations  
 Many Americans view the culture of federal agencies as slow, conservative, 
adverse to risk, and resistant to change40.  Through the use of competitive sourcing, 
government agencies are compelled to identify the MEO capable of delivering the 
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required services41.  This externally initiated self-evaluation forces the agencies to review 
their processes and increase their efficiency42.  Some proponents of outsourcing claim 
that managed competitions not only increase efficiency, but also enhance quality, 
increase productivity, and spur on technological advances43.      
 These views were supported in the President’s 1999 budget, which stated that 
competition spurs efficiency.  Agencies that require or provide administrative or other 
commercial support services should have the stimulus of competition to make available 
new technologies, capital, and new management techniques to improve performance and 
reduce costs44. 
Speaking at an outsourcing symposium in 1997, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the former 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, summed up the issue by 
stating: 
If done correctly, competitive sourcing not only saves money, it helps the 
DoD to be an organization that thrives on competition, innovation, 
responsiveness to changing need, efficiency, and reliability45. 
 
 Competitive sourcing forces many government organizations to take an inward 
look at themselves, which would not have occurred otherwise.  In “Personnel Savings in 
Competitively Sourced DoD Activities” (2000), Susan Gates and Albert Robbert 
discussed why government managers rarely attempt to streamline their organizations 
without outside stimulus. 
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 In the private sector, managers face strong incentives to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness.  The quality and cost of outputs are constantly monitored and managers are 
evaluated based these factors.  Private sector managers are incentivized to make their 
organizations more efficient and effective. 
 Government managers, on the other hand, are often not evaluated on 
organizational outputs or outcomes because outcomes are too difficult to measure or 
because they depend on factors beyond the managers’ control.  In the instances when 
managers are judged on outcomes, it tends to be based on quality and not cost.  With this 
incentive structure, managers tend to maximize the availability of resources, including 
human resources, required to produce quality outputs.  Government mangers are actually 
incentivized to maximize the size of their organizations46. 
 By taking away the status quo as an option, the A-76 process is intended to make 
government organizations more effective and efficient by forcing managers to streamline 
their organizations. 
4. Cost Reductions  
Currently, about 60% of DoD’s annual obligation authority is consumed by 
support infrastructure costs, of which personnel account for nearly half of the total47.  As 
can be imagined, these infrastructure costs are an enticing source of potentially large 
savings which could be used to finance weapons and equipment modernization48 and 
quality of life improvements49. 
 Since the creation of more efficient organizations results in cost reductions50, 
competitive sourcing is increasingly viewed as a way to reduce overhead costs and 
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capture savings51.  But cost savings are often achieved regardless of whether the 
government or the commercial sector wins the competition52. 
 DoD estimates claim that increased efficiencies resulting from competitions could 
yield 20-30% cost savings53.  In 1998, the DoD projected that these savings could 
amount to over $6B by FY2003 and $2.5B each year thereafter54.     
 In 2003, OMB claimed that the DoD had achieved greater than 30% savings on 
the roughly 3,000 competitions it had conducted since 197955.  A separate claim by the 
DoD stated that the Department had saved over $1,478M, or 30%, in personnel costs 
alone on 2,138 A-76 studies completed between the years 1978 and 199656.  While 
estimates of cost savings vary over time and between sources, most claim that the savings 
have been quite large. 
5. Summary 
Two logistics experts, LCDR Stephen Ferris and David Keithly summed up the 
reasons for outsourcing by concluding: 
When judiciously exercised, outsourcing heightens performance, produces 
a streamlined workforce, and provides the best personnel.  As a rule, 
specialization contributes to economies of scale and helps simplify 
organizational structures.  Proper logistic outsourcing permits the armed 
services to focus on their respective core competencies.  In short, 
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C. RISKS OF OUTSOURCING 
1. Introduction 
There are risks associated with outsourcing.  These risks have led to the growing 
perception among some critics that outsourcing is not always to the government’s 
advantage and that outsourcing may actually compromise the DoD’s ability to 
accomplish its national security mission58.   
 Risks are often the key determining factors in the success or failure of an 
outsourcing initiative59.  However, the A-76 process places such a strong emphasis on 
cost avoidance that few people would propose a more costly in-house alternative to 
outsourcing, even though it may provide a greater long-term strategic benefit to the 
organization60.  This has led to a process and mindset that focuses on outsourcing all 
commercial functions that can be performed more cheaply by the private sector, without 
giving much consideration to the associated risks.   
 One reason for this may be that the risks, and associated costs, are difficult to 
define and quantify, while the benefits of outsourcing, which are usually expressed as the 
relative cost reduction from outsourcing compared to in-house operations, are much more 
straightforward61.   
 Several costs, such as consultant fees and contract administration fees, are usually 
considered in the analysis.  But other less-quantifiable costs are often ignored.  These 
costs may include the long-run competitiveness of the agency if one or more of its core 
competencies are inadvertently outsourced, increased supplier power, the structural 
change of the value chain, and loss of strategic flexibility62. 
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The simple fact is that bottom-line savings estimates often gold-plate, or cover up, 
outsourcing risks63.  This brings up an apparent dichotomy in the competitive sourcing 
process.  The A-76 process is focused on cost savings, but only 5% of government 
agencies express their objectives in terms of short-term cost savings64.  For this reason, 
many experts believe that DoD should not focus on outsourcing as strictly a short-term 
cost cutting procedure, but as a mechanism that offers both improved efficiency and 
lower costs over the long run65 and provides a long-term competitive advantage to the 
agency66.   
2. Types of Risk 
 The two major types of risk are strategic and operational67.   
a. Strategic Risks  
Strategic risks are associated with the decision of whether or not to 
outsource a function.  The three specific strategic risks are the outsourcing of core 
competencies, loss of flexibility, and opportunistic behavior. 
(1)  Outsourcing of Core Competencies.  The DoD Senior 
Executive Council defines a military core competency as “a complex harmonization of 
individual technologies and production skills that create unique military capabilities 
valued by the force employing [commander in chief]”68.  According to the Council, a 
core competency has potential application to a wide variety of national security needs, 
provides a significant contribution to the combatant commander’s desired effect, would 
be difficult for competitors to imitate, provides the means to differentiate from 
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competitors, crosses organizational boundaries within an enterprise, is a direct contributor 
to the perceived value of the service, does not diminish with use, deploys with forces, and 
provides training and experience that forms the basis of ethos and culture69.  
   Because they are uniquely military in nature and of vital 
importance to national security, the DoD’s core competencies should not be outsourced.  
However, the A-76 process does not consider core competencies in its analysis.  It instead 
focuses on whether a function is inherently governmental.  The important thing to 
consider is that while the concepts of “inherently governmental” and “core” are similar 
and may overlap, they may not always be the same.  Specifically, not all inherently 
governmental functions would be considered core, and not all core functions would be 
considered inherently governmental70. 
   During the competitive sourcing process, DoD agencies should 
conduct strategic assessments to identify their core competencies and ensure that they 
maintain control of them so they can continue to meet future mission requirements. 
(2)  Loss of Flexibility.  DoD agencies should consider their 
strategic flexibility during the competitive sourcing process.  If considered independently 
of one another, each function could be outsourced to a different organization, public or 
private, that specializes in that function.  Doing this would increase the efficiency of each 
function, but would eliminate the possibility of a system-wide innovation.  Instead of 
looking only at the incremental benefits of outsourcing each individual function, agencies 
should complete a comprehensive strategic evaluation of all past and current outsourcing 
initiatives and consider them as a whole71.    
   If an agency fails to do this and outsources its functions to too 
many different organizations, the opportunities for cross-functional communication and 
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synergy are lost72.  The resulting effort required to coordinate all of the different 
functions across the inefficient array of independent suppliers could easily outweigh any 
benefits. 
(3)  Opportunistic Behavior.  DoD agencies should also consider 
the impacts of their outsourcing decision on the entire value chain.  Once a function is 
outsourced, the agency effectively removes itself as a supplier of that function73.  The 
result could be a de facto value chain integration that could place control of the function 
in the hands of only a few suppliers, who could then use their newfound power to engage 
in opportunistic behavior and dictate unfavorable terms to the agency.    
Opportunistic behavior, which is defined as “self-interest seeking 
with guile”, can manifest itself in different ways.  Firms can exercise opportunistic 
behavior by strictly following contracts and only performing functions explicitly listed in 
the contract, or by reacting slowly to a crisis and using this as an opportunity to seek 
additional compensation74. 
     Opportunistic behavior is most likely to occur if the agency is 
bound in a contract and is unable to use alternate suppliers, if the agency becomes 
extremely reliant on the supplier, or if the function is so important that the agency cannot 
afford any interruptions in service75.  Agencies should carefully consider the likelihood 
and implications of opportunistic behavior during the competitive sourcing process. 
b. Operational Risks 
  Operational risks are not associated with the decision of whether to 
outsource a function, but rather the decision of how the function will be outsourced76.  
These risks include the packaging of requirements; an incomplete Statement of Work 
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(SOW), Performance Work Statement (PWS), or Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan 
(QASP); the quality and type of contract; and insufficient resources to manage the 
contract. 
(1)  Packaging of Requirements.  During the “packaging” stage of 
the A-76 process, the agencies identify the commercial activities within their 
organizations that are to be studied77.  It is important that the managers within the agency 
understand how to properly bundle or unbundle the activities being outsourced78.  While 
this may sound obvious, this initial stage will have a large impact in determining whether 
the outsourcing initiative will be successful.   
   If several functions are included in the package, fewer contractors 
will be able to compete for the contract and the agency could become vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior.  At the same time, unbundling too many functions could lead to 
an excessive number of contractors and higher coordination costs79.  Unfortunately, 
finding the optimal middle ground between these two extremes is both subjective and 
difficult.   
(2)  Insufficient SOW/PWS/QASP.  It is very important for 
agencies to devote the time and effort necessary to adequately define the requirements 
being outsourced and develop high-quality outsourcing documents.  Failure to do so will 
often result in ineffective or incomplete SOW’s and PWS’s.  These poor-quality 
documents can lead the agency to purchase goods and services that are not really needed 
or, more commonly, under-define their requirements and then execute costly 
modifications to expand the contract.   
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Furthermore, an effective PWS and QASP will help to identify 
areas in which the contractors can exhibit opportunistic behavior80, enabling the 
government to take proactive steps to minimize the likelihood and impact of these 
behaviors.   
(3)  Quality and Type of Contract.  Inappropriate or poorly written 
contracts can expose the agency to a high risk of interrupted service, poor quality, and 
cost growth81.  To minimize these risks, contracts should clearly state service levels and 
measurements, penalties for non-performance, growth and inflation rates, and termination 
provisions82.  If applicable, they should also address potential contingency situations to 
eliminate the costly and time-consuming contract modifications that would result if the 
contingency were to occur.  
     The contract should also consider the incentives implicit in the 
various contract types and then pick the one that is best suited for the function being 
outsourced83.  For example, a fixed-price contract is often the best option for a well-
defined, routine, or recurring service such as janitorial or lawn maintenance.  However, it 
is usually not appropriate for complex services because it does not provide the flexibility, 
incentives, and governance mechanisms needed to achieve cost savings84.  For complex 
services, such as Research and Development (R&D), a cost-type contract is usually the 
best option.     
(4)  Length of Contract.  The contract length is an important factor 
in the success or failure of the outsourcing initiative.  In dealing with long-term contracts, 
it is nearly impossible to anticipate how the future will unfold because, as time passes, 
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the market will likely change or evolve in unforeseen ways85.  Many estimates, including 
growth and inflation, become less reliable with time86 and new technologies may 
drastically change the way the work is performed.  The agency’s mission could also 
change, requiring either more or less contractor support.  However, long-term contracts 
commit the agency to its current decision even though these, and other, factors may 
change significantly during the execution of the contract87. 
Long-term contracts can also transfer a great deal of power to the 
contractor and allow for opportunistic behavior unless the forces of the competitive 
market can be reintroduced during the contract period88.  To be fair, there are also high 
costs associated with short-term contracts.  Not only would additional resources be 
required to conduct the outsourcing initiative more frequently, but contractor prices 
would also be higher because of startup costs, fixed costs, and a higher contractor risk 
resulting from a reduction in job stability.  The mission of the unit may also suffer if there 
is constant turmoil from frequent contractor turnover.   
One compromise is a base contract with option periods that enable 
both the firm and supplier to review the relationship periodically and consider other 
alternatives89.  However, even this arrangement is not perfect and outsourcing agencies 
should ensure they weigh any cost-savings from long-term contracts against their 
inherent loss of flexibility.  In the end, choosing the correct contract length is a very 
subjective decision that must be accomplished on a case-by-case basis. 
(5)  Insufficient Resources to Manage Contract.  After a function is 
outsourced, the agency needs to ensure that it allocates sufficient resources to manage the 
contract effectively.  Although these resources should have been included in the sourcing 
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decision, they can sometimes be reduced or re-distributed as budgets shrink and 
leadership is replaced.  If this occurs, poor performance and rising costs are likely to 
occur.  If the function being performed is a core or near-core competency, the results can 
be particularly disastrous90. 
3. How to Determine Contract Risk 
 Now that we have discussed some of the major types of risk associated with 
outsourcing, we will focus our efforts on how to determine the level of those risks.  In his 
thesis titled “Transaction Cost Economics and A-76: Framework for Defense Managers,” 
Craig Powell talked at length about the field of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and 
how it can be used to determine and minimize contract risk.  The three risk factors he 
considered were asset specificity, complexity, and frequency. 
 Powell defined risk in terms of colored lights.  A Red Light represents high risk, a 
Yellow Light represents medium risk, and a Green Light represents low risk.  He stated 
that the color of the light can be determined by the managers and contracting officers 
asking the following questions: 
- How many firms can perform this function? 
- What is the composition and degree of asset specificity involved? 
- What are the opportunities for holdup? 
- What is a reasonable contract period that will allow the government the 
ability to renegotiate or re-compete if necessary? 
- What incentives and award fees are necessary to ensure contractor 
compliance that could also be used to reward outstanding performance91? 
a. Asset Specificity  
There are six commonly accepted categories of asset specificity in TCE:   
- Physical Asset Specificity refers to an asset or piece of equipment that is 
required to produce a particular product; 
- Human Asset Specificity is the knowledge and skills that individuals 
acquire while working for an organization; 
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- Site Specificity refers to assets that are bound together by location in order 
to produce a product; 
- Dedicated Asset Specificity includes items that are required to 
manufacture a product for a particular buyer; 
- Brand-name Asset Specificity exists where investments made by one party 
are affected by the reputations or actions of other firms, such as 
franchises; 
- Temporal Asset Specificity refers to investments in time-critical areas or 
bottleneck activities that have a great impact on delivery schedule and 
costs92. 
The basic premise of asset specificity is that highly specialized functions 
tend to have greater risk and higher costs.  Transactions that involve a greater degree of 
asset specificity, higher uncertainty, and are not frequently conducted tend to require 
more complex contracts and more explicit monitoring of the contracts93.     
Red Lights exist when physical asset specificity is high, there are few 
other firms, the tasks to be performed are highly specific, and the threat of opportunistic 
behavior is high94.  Opportunistic behavior is likely to occur whenever a contractor is 
asked to invest in specific assets.  Because the government usually directly or indirectly 
pays for specific assets in the contract, it is more inclined to remain in an agreement with 
the current contractor who has already invested in the assets, rather than start again with a 
new contractor.  An example of this would be the design and procurement of a new 
aircraft.  The chance of opportunistic behavior increases even further if the requirement is 
highly specific in nature and the contractor is the only supplier that can perform the 
function95. 
In a Red Light situation, the contract should be well specified with a 
detailed cost structure that offers incentives and award fees to reward outstanding service.  
Substandard performance should be clearly delineated in the contract and should result in 
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the loss of incentive and award fees96.  Fixed-price contracts, with their limited cost 
flexibility, increase the probability of opportunistic behavior occurring. 
b. Complexity  
In general, the more complex a transaction, the more difficult it is to 
realize cost savings through outsourcing97.  Complex, or Red Light, transactions, such as 
R&D, require very long and detailed contracts.  Since so many factors and intricacies 
need to be included, writing a “complete contract” that includes every detail, considers 
every contingency, and minimizes opportunistic behavior is extremely difficult.  The 
outsourcing of complex requirements often results in cost overruns.   
c. Frequency  
Red Light functions must be performed quickly on a frequent basis98.  An 
example would be the monitoring and maintenance of a computer network in a Network 
Operations Security Center (NOSC).  Because of the constant supervision required, the 
costs associated with administering this type of contract are significant.  Furthermore, if 
the requirement is for a core or near-core competency and the contractor fails to perform 
the function in a timely manner, the impact to mission readiness could be devastating.  In 
this situation, the agency should choose a cost contract with clear guidelines for 
minimum acceptable performance and incentives for outstanding performance99. 
4. Different Goals from Participants 
 A consideration that is often overlooked is that each member of the government 
outsourcing team has different, and often contradictory, goals.  The end user, or 
customer, wants to get the highest level of service.  Financial managers and comptrollers 
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are concerned with the bottom line, and focus their attention on cost savings.  Contracting 
officers want to write an adequate contract and adhere to regulations100.   
 On the other side of the fence, the contractor is trying to perform an adequate 
level of service and maximize its profit.  If the government team cannot compromise and 
work together to provide the end user with good service at a low cost while following all 
of the regulations, the infighting amongst the members may allow the contractor to take 
advantage of the situation.    
5. Conclusion 
 The various risks mentioned previously can negatively impact the agency in many 
ways.  There is often cost growth associated with poorly defined requirements and 
opportunistic behavior.  There is also a loss of flexibility when a function is outsourced 
because when military and government civilian personnel are replaced with contractor 
personnel, commanders no longer have the authority to adjust schedules or requirements 
unless those changes are specifically addressed in the contract101.  Of course, any 
changes outside of the contract will contribute to cost growth.  
 While cost growth and the loss of flexibility are arguably the most visible 
negative impacts of outsourcing, they are certainly not the only ones.  Some critics 
believe that:  
- Safety may be compromised since private contractors do not subject their 
workers to the same level of educational and training requirements as 
federal workers;  
- The threat of strikes and work stoppages, prohibited to federal workers, 
could damage the military’s operational capabilities;  
- Federal workers take oaths to uphold the national interest, while private 
contractors do not;  
- Costs and efficiency will govern contractor business decisions, potentially 
replacing loyal, experienced, and higher paid federal workers with 
disloyal, inexperienced, and lesser-paid contract workers102. 
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 In an article about operational contractor support, Colonel Michael Rampy, 
United States Army (Ret.), Ph.D., gave the following prediction:   
System support contractors primarily sustain individual systems and 
equipment… These contractors perform specific and precisely defined 
activities that are essential to operating modern military systems.  As 
weapons and technological systems become increasingly sophisticated and 
integral to operations at all levels of war, the need for technical expertise 
in the 21st century battlespace has never been greater.  With the 
introduction of increasingly sophisticated weaponry and technologically 
advanced systems, a revolution in military affairs assures that system 
support contractors will become increasingly crucial components of 
successful mission accomplishment103. 
 
 As we head into a time of increasing reliance on contractor support, we need to 
remember, and consider, all of the risks associated with outsourcing.   
D. PROBLEMS WITH COST ESTIMATES 
1. Introduction 
The Committee harbors serious concerns about the current DoD 
outsourcing and privatization effort.  While the Committee recognizes the 
need to reduce DoD infrastructure costs, the cost savings benefits from the 
current outsourcing and privatization effort are, at best, debatable.  Despite 
end-strength savings, there is no clear evidence that this effort is reducing 
the cost of support function within DoD with high cost contractors simply 
replacing government employees104. 
   - Final report of the House Appropriations Committee, 1999 
 
 We discussed the large estimated cost savings that DoD realizes through 
outsourcing.  However, many experts, including the House Appropriations Committee, 
believe that these estimates are overstated.    
2. Reasons for Overstated Cost Savings Estimates  
 In this subsection, we will discuss seven reasons why the DoD may overestimate 
its cost savings from outsourcing.  They include: inadequate records, acquisition and 
investment costs, transfers of costs, forced labor rates, imprecise cost factors, costs of 
personnel reductions, and cancelled competitions.   
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a. Inadequate Records 
DoD has had difficulty identifying and assessing current costs because 
many agencies do not maintain adequate financial records of work performed in-
house105.  The financial data used to calculate current costs, as well as resulting cost 
savings, is stored in the Commercial Activities Management Information System 
(CAMIS) database.  Among other things, each DoD component is required to enter the 
original manpower baseline cost of the function being outsourced, the estimated cost 
savings of the competition, and the actual costs for the first five years after the 
competition is completed106. 
GAO has reported concerns about the accuracy and completeness of data 
contained in CAMIS107.  As early as 1990, GAO stated that CAMIS contained inaccurate 
and incomplete data108.  In a 1996 report, the Center for Naval Analyses also found that 
the data in CAMIS was incomplete and inconsistent among the services and 
recommended that the data collection process be more tightly controlled so that data 
would be consistently recorded109.  In 2000, GAO again reported deficiencies in the 
CAMIS database110.   
   GAO found that data, once entered into CAMIS, was often not modified to 
reflect changes in, or even termination of, contracts.  Some competitions were recorded 
as completed even though they were still underway or had not yet begun.  In some cases 
data was not adjusted and removed from the system even when bases were closed or 
realigned.  In addition, GAO found that CAMIS did not accurately track baseline costs or 
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reasons for contract changes, and did not contain accurate and complete data on items 
such as program implementation or contract administration costs111.  All of these factors 
combine to make it very difficult to develop accurate baseline cost estimates and track 
cost savings. 
b. Acquisition and Investment Costs  
The DoD does not always consider all of the investment costs associated 
with performing the competitive sourcing analysis and transitioning to either the MEO or 
contractor performance.  The total sourcing costs often include:   
- Training of government personnel involved in the A-76 process; 
- Production of study documents (PWS, MEO, etc) by government 
employees with contractor support; 
- Source selection and evaluation board costs, to include the salary of 
government employees evaluating contractor and government proposals; 
- Independent review of government documents; 
- Lost productivity and redistribution of work normally done by employees 
directly or indirectly involved in the study; 
- Transition costs, such as employee workshops, job fairs, additional 
administrative support to affected employees, management of potentially 
adverse employee impacts, and transition training; 
- Contractor phase-in and overlapped expenses associated with loss of 
government workers prior to contract start date; 
- Voluntary separation incentive payments to reduce effects of reductions in 
force; 
- Severance pay; 
- Priority placement program entitlement expenses for displaced employees 
gaining employment outside the commuting area112. 
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In FY 2004, DoD estimated that the acquisition and investment costs total 
$3,000 for each position outsourced113.  Since DoD’s savings projections have not 
adequately accounted for these costs, the expected level of savings is significantly 
reduced in the short-term114.    
c. Transfer of Costs  
Some outsourcing initiatives which appear to reduce costs merely do so by 
transferring a portion of their costs to other organizations.  For instance, cost reductions 
achieved through privatized housing are often incurred as higher outlays for housing 
allowance115.  If a base manages its own housing units, the housing allowance due to the 
residents is retained by the base to cover its maintenance expenses.  If the housing is 
privatized, the base is no longer responsible for maintaining the housing units and is able 
to reduce its maintenance budget.  But, at the same time, it must begin to pay housing 
allowance to its residents so they, in turn, can pay rent to the contractor.  Unless the 
increase in housing allowance is considered in the outsourcing analysis, the cost 
estimates will not be accurate and savings will be overstated.  A similar scenario can 
occur when military workers are replaced with civilian workers.  
Many agencies use substantially fewer workers when military personnel 
are replaced with civilians.  In fact, some agencies estimate the ratio of workers needed to 
be 0.6 civilians for each military position116.  The reason for this low substitution factor 
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training, local details, or deployments.  However, whenever the civilianization of military 
positions is used to reduce the size of the workforce, some of the assumed savings may 
be difficult to realize117.  
If the training, details, and deployments meet valid and continuing defense 
requirements, the burden of supporting them is not eliminated by civilianization.  Rather, 
the burden is shifted to other agencies with military workforces118.  An example would 
be communications personnel who were replaced by civilian personnel and then 
transferred to a different base that still used military communications personnel.  The 
increase in personnel costs at the other base would need to be included in the analysis to 
determine the true cost of outsourcing the positions.   
A second concern is that even though military positions may be 
outsourced, the overall military authorizations in that service may not decline because the 
military positions that are deleted from one function are put to use in another function119.  
An example would be if communications billets were eliminated and then the billets were 
increased in the intelligence career field.  In either scenario, the end result of an 
outsourcing initiative that reduced costs could actually be a net increase in personnel 
costs for the DoD if the cost reductions in the outsourcing agency do not outweigh the 
personnel costs that were transferred to another agency or unit.    
d. Forced Labor Rates 
Contractors are required, by law, to provide their employees working 
under government contracts with a minimum level of pay and benefits.  Specifically, 
service workers are covered by the Service Contract Act of 1965 and construction 
workers are covered by the Davis Bacon Act of 1931.  Both of these acts direct that the 
Department of Labor establish flat hourly rates for skill classifications in different 
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geographic areas based on the median level of pay for each job classification in each 
area120.  These rates are periodically reviewed and updated as necessary.   
The result of these acts is that contractors are essentially forced into 
paying these rates to every worker, regardless of the nature of the work being performed.  
This occurs because the contractors are not allowed to pay their workers below the 
minimum rate.  At the same time, they will usually not desire to pay their workers above 
the rate because it would raise their costs and reduce the likelihood that they would be 
awarded the contract.  Since the labor rate is equal to the median level of pay for the job 
classification in the local area, the government often pays for an “average” worker 
regardless of the skill level that is actually required to perform the work.  If the work 
could be done by a lower-skilled worker, the government ends up paying for an over-
qualified worker.  If the work should be done by a higher-skilled worker, there may be 
quality issues to address.   
e. Imprecise Cost Factors  
Cost estimates are based on assumptions.  The validity and accuracy of 
these assumptions have a direct impact on the validity and accuracy of the cost estimate.  
There are three primary cost factors, or assumptions, that have come under a lot of 
scrutiny.  They include the minimum cost differential, the personnel cost overhead rate, 
and the personnel cost estimates.   
In order to win a competition, the contractor must meet a minimum cost 
differential of at least 10% or $10M, whichever is lower, less than the MEO’s 
proposal121, which is intended to cover the transition costs required to convert from 
government to contractor performance.  The authors find three main problems with this 
cost differential.   
First, it assumes that all contracts will have transition costs equal to the 
minimum cost differential.  Not only is this blatantly naïve, but it fails to consider that 
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some contracts, such as those performing very large or complex tasks, can have 
drastically different transition costs than those performing other smaller or simpler tasks.   
Second, the rate is not uniform across different costs.  For instance, if the 
MEO bid $1,000, the contractor would need to bid $900 ($100, or 10%, lower than the 
MEO bid) to win the contract.  If the contract was much larger and the MEO bid $1B, the 
contractor would only need to bid $990M ($10M, or 1%, lower than the MEO bid) to win 
the contract.   
Third, the rate is very arbitrary in nature.  For instance, if the MEO bid 
$95.0M and the contractor bid $85.6, or $9.4M less, the contractor would not win the 
competition because it failed to meet the minimum cost differential.  However, if the 
MEO had instead bid $95.2M, the contractor would have met the differential and been 
awarded the contract.  It seems that a contract of such magnitude should be decided upon 
by more than a mere 0.20% ($200k/$95M) difference in cost.  At present, there does not 
appear to be much leeway for the agency to use its own discretion to weigh the transition 
costs versus the cost savings for its particular requirement.    
Since 1996, MEO cost estimates have applied a flat overhead rate of 12% 
to direct personnel costs122.  This overhead rate is intended to cover two types of 
overhead: operations overhead and general and administrative (G&A) overhead.  
Operations overhead includes costs that are not 100% attributable to the activity, but are 
generally associated with recurring management and support of the activity.  G&A 
overhead includes the salaries, equipment, space, and other activities related to 
headquarters management, accounting, personnel, legal support, data processing 
management, and similar common services performed outside the activity123. 
There are indications that the 12% overhead rate can misstate the marginal 
cost of overhead support for in-house performance.  Operations overhead is often 
undiminished by outsourcing because outsourcing does not reduce the command, 
executive, and functional oversight responsibilities at higher organizational levels such as 
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the installation, major command, or service headquarters.  G&A overhead is often 
undiminished because contractors occupy government-furnished facilities and use 
government-furnished equipment and parts.  In fact, the only significant overhead costs 
saved through outsourcing are associated with the personnel and payroll support of the 
displaced workforce124. 
Furthermore, GAO has voiced concern that this rate, which is specified in 
the A-76 Circular, lacks an analytical basis and may be overstating, or understating, the 
overhead costs associated with in-house performance125.  In fact, the 12% rate is 
reportedly nothing more than a compromise between private-sector interests, which 
argued for government overhead rates ranging from 15-30%, and rates used in earlier A-
76 competitions, which generally ranged from 0-3%126.  If true, this allegation would 
seriously question the validity of the rate.           
MEO cost estimates use the salary of a General Service (GS) employee at 
step 5, and a Federal Wage System (FWS) worker at step four plus a fringe rate stipulated 
in the A-76 Circular.  There has been concern that these cost estimates may not be very 
accurate because they are not based on the actual personnel costs associated with the 
individuals occupying the particular positions127.  
This method of determining personnel costs could lead to either an 
overestimate or underestimate of the actual baseline personnel costs.  If the workforce has 
been in place a long time and there is little turnover, the average pay level is likely to be 
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wage and salary costs would be underestimated.  On the other hand, if there is high 
turnover and the average step is low, the estimates would overestimate the actual wage 
and salary costs128. 
f. Cost of Personnel Reductions  
The majority of cost reductions from outsourcing competitions come from 
reductions in personnel, which are often the result of a reduction in work scope129.  In 
principle, the scope of work is reduced because the function in no longer needed.  But 
many times it is instead the result of the DoD agency doing a poor job defining the work 
package that is to be performed by the contractor130.  Oftentimes a reduction in personnel 
is only associated with contractor performance.  The fact is that even when the MEO 
wins an A-76 competition, the new in-house organization typically restructures the work 
and reduces its number of employees131.  The end result is that regardless of whether the 
reduction in work scope is intentional and what organization wins the competition, the 
size of the work force is usually reduced. 
As has been previously discussed in this chapter, the estimated cost 
savings associated with contractor performance are often overestimated.  Unfortunately, 
the same is also true when the MEO is implemented.  After winning the competition, the 
in-house organization will usually conduct a Reduction In Force (RIF) to scale the 
organization down to it proposed size.   
During a RIF, the DoD offers eligible personnel a cash incentive of up to 
$25,000 to retire or voluntarily separate132.  Those who do not voluntarily separate are 
either given a position within the new organization or are given priority placement into 
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other jobs within DoD for which they are qualified.  Oftentimes, the personnel remaining 
in the organization are downgraded to lower-graded positions.  The purpose is to lower 
the average personnel pay grade and reduce the organization’s personnel costs.  
Unfortunately, this is usually little more than an exercise on paper.  According to RIF 
procedures, government employees who accept a lower-graded position is eligible to 
retain their former grade and pay for two years.  At the end of the two year period, if the 
employees remain in the same position, their grade may be lowered but their pay is 
not133.   
The following example, from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, is a fairly 
typical illustration of how government personnel are affected when the MEO wins the A-
76 competition134.  The facts are as follows:  The organization originally had 623 
personnel; 428 civilian and 195 military.  After the competition, all of the military were 
assigned to other duties and 83 full-time civilian positions were eliminated.  Of those 
eliminated, 28 obtained other government positions, 53 chose voluntary separation, and 2 
were involuntarily separated.  Of the remaining 345 civilians in the organization, 52% 
experienced a reduction in grade, 31% remained at their same grade level, 1% obtained a 
higher grade level, and 15% changed wage systems, making it difficult to determine the 
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Figure 1.   Break-down of Personnel Affected by Outsourcing 
 
Source:  Author created from DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on 
Federal Employees' Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary 
 
The government advertised an estimated $97M in cost reductions by 
implementing the MEO.  After all, they eliminated 278 of 623 positions (almost 45%), 
and reduced the pay grade of over half of the remaining personnel.  Assuming that the 
reduction in personnel will not adversely affect the unit’s mission readiness, this 
outsourcing competition appears to be very successful indeed.   
However, we can use the same facts to tell a very different story.  There 
were originally 623 personnel in the organization.  After the MEO was implemented, 195 
military members and 28 civilian personnel were moved into other government positions.  
These personnel were taken off the organization’s payroll but, since they are still 
government employees, their salaries are just transferred to different government 
organizations.  In sum, the government, in its entirety, only realized a reduction of 55 
positions (a mere 9%).  And, of the 55 positions that were eliminated, 53 were paid 
upwards of $25,000 each, or $1,325,000 total, to separate voluntarily.  Furthermore, 
while over half of the remaining personnel were reduced in grade, no immediate cost 
savings will be realized since they will retain their same pay indefinitely.   
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When we consider that only two positions were eliminated at no-cost, 
upwards of $1.325M was paid to separating employees, and an estimated $3,000 per 
competed position was spent to conduct the competition (see “Acquisition and 
Investment Costs” in Section D of this chapter), it appears that this outsourcing initiative 
may have actually cost the government almost $3.2M.  This example serves as a perfect 
illustration of how cost savings can be overestimated even when the in-house 
organization wins the A-76 competition.     
g. Cancelled Competitions  
Another reason for high-cost estimates is cancelled outsourcing 
competitions.  The savings estimates used by the DoD are based on the number of 
positions slated for competition.  However, historically, more than 40% of initiated 
competitions have been cancelled before completion135.  While there is no available data 
on the cost savings generated by these cancelled competitions, we can assume that they 
are low because when a competition is cancelled, the activity normally remains in-house, 
and the in-house management is under no obligation to implement the MEO or otherwise 
improve efficiency136.  In addition, there will be some costs incurred, albeit less than a 
completed competition, for each of these cancelled competitions.  Therefore, even if 
completed competitions do yield the advertised 30% savings, the expected savings 
generated by each initiated competition are far less137.     
3. Overstated Cost Savings  
The result of these seven reasons appears to be overstated cost savings from A-76 
competitions.  In a 1997 report on the outsourcing of DoD logistics functions, GAO 
concluded that $4B out of $6B in projected savings were overstated due to errors in 
estimates, dubious assumptions, and legal and cultural barriers138.  Two years later, in 
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1999, GAO auditors concluded that their 1998 estimates of savings from competitions 
were too high and that the estimated savings between FY1997 and FY2003 were 
overstated139.  In 2000, GAO again revised many of their cost-savings estimates and 
reduced their cost-savings goals even further140. 
 It should be noted that it is very difficult to track cost savings over time because 
of changing workload requirements and the effects these changes have on program costs 
and the baseline from which the estimates are calculated141.  Even so, savings resulting 
from A-76 competitions have reportedly ranged from 20-30% lower than original 
projections142.      
4. Funding Shortfalls  
The DoD is trying to use the A-76 process to shift military personnel away from 
commercial-type functions and into those more directly related to warfighting.  The Air 
Force, in particular, has made this a high priority but has not been able to outsource its 
military positions as quickly as it would like.  In fact, the number one unfunded priority 
for the Air Force in FY2004 was $2.34B to move 6,300 military positions out of non-core 
functions143.  This brings up a very interesting question.  If outsourcing results in cost 
savings, why did the Air Force not have the funding necessary to outsource these 
positions?  
The answer is that many outsourcing competitions actually create funding 
shortfalls.  When the outsourcing activities publicize their cost-savings estimates, their 
budget is usually reduced by the DoD to reflect the savings.  Then the DoD, in turn, 
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either has its budget reduced by Congress or redistributes the savings to other projects.  
Either way, the funding is no longer available for the original activity to use.   
As long as the outsourcing competitions realize their estimated cost savings, 
everyone is satisfied.  However, if the competitions fall short of their savings estimates, 
even by a small amount, funding shortfalls are created.  To illustrate, we will assume that 
a particular organization estimates $10M in cost savings by outsourcing and then falls 
20% short of its estimate.  In this case, the outsourcing competition would create a $2M 
shortfall despite the fact that it also reduced the organizations costs by $8M.  When a 
situation like this occurs, the outsourcing activity has to either absorb the shortfall 
internally or ask for more funding from DoD.  Either way, tough decisions will need to be 
made, and other projects and missions will likely suffer.      
5. Conclusion  
There are two conclusions from this section.  The first, that cost savings are often 
overestimated, is probably not very surprising.  The second, that cost savings can actually 
create funding shortfalls, is not so intuitive.  Ironically, as we saw in the previous 
subsection, it is often the competitive sourcing process itself that suffers from its own 
shortcomings.    
E. FAIR ACT AND THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA 
1. FAIR Act 
 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act was signed into law on 
October 19, 1998144.  It required that the heads of each executive agency review their 
agencies activities and submit to the Director of OMB and Congress a list of the activities 
performed by government employees which, in their opinion, were not inherently 
governmental145.  In this case, the definition used for inherently governmental was “those 
[activities] so intimately related to the exercise of the public interest as to mandate 
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performance by federal employees”146.  In all, a total of 850,000 commercial positions 
were identified throughout the federal government. 
2. The President’s Management Agenda 
 In August 2001, President Bush unveiled “The President’s Management Agenda” 
(PMA), which identified competitive sourcing as one of five management initiatives 
designed to enhance government effectiveness147.  The goal of the competitive sourcing 
initiative was to “simplify and improve the procedures for evaluating public and private 
sources, to better publicize the activities subject to competition, and to ensure senior level 
agency attention to the promotion of competition”148.    
 As part of the PMA, the Bush Administration directed that half of the 850,000 
commercial positions identified in the FAIR Act be competed or directly converted to 
private sector performance by the end of FY2008149.  As it turned out, 453,000 of these 
positions were within the DoD.  The DoD was given interim targets to compete 15% 
(68,000 positions) by the end of FY2003 and 50% (226,000 positions) by the end of 
FY2008150.    
3. Problems Meeting Goals  
 DoD reported that as of June 1, 2003, it has met OMB’s short-term goal of 
competing 15% of the positions identified in DoD’s commercial activities inventory by 
the end of fiscal year 2003151.  However, meeting the longer-term goal to compete at 
least 50% (226,000) of the positions before the end of FY2008 is presenting a challenge.    
 There are two reasons why the next goal is presenting such a challenge.  The first 
is that the DoD has chosen to conduct the simplest competitions to this point.  This means 
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that each new competition is more difficult and resource-intensive than the one before.  
The result has been a steady decline in the number of new competitions announced each 
year.   
As can be seen in Figure 2, there is a significant lag-time from when an 
outsourcing competition is announced to when it is completed.  Although the number of 
positions completed has been steadily increasing, the decline in positions announced 
means that there are consistently fewer positions under competition at any one time.  
Already we have reached the point where the positions completed curve is moving 
parallel to the positions announced curve.  This means that there cannot be a significant 
increase in the number of positions completed unless there is a correspondingly 
significant increase in the positions announced for competition. 
 
















Cumulative Positions Announced Cumulative Positions Completed
 
Figure 2.   DoD A-76 Positions Announced and Completed (FY1997-2003) 
 
Source: Author created from Defense Management: DOD Faces Challenges 
Implementing its Core Competency Approach and A-76 Competitions and Competitive 




 The second reason why the next goal is so challenging is that it represents a large 
increase in the number of competitions in a short period of time.  In fact, the number of 
positions competed between FY1997 and FY2003 was twice the number competed 
between FY1978 and FY1996152, and the number of positions proposed for competition 
between FY2003 and FY2008 is twice the number competed between FY1997 and 
FY2003153.  This means that the DoD has, and will need to continue, to exponentially 
increase the number of positions competed to meet OMB’s goal.   
 This exponential rate of growth is shown in Figure 3.  As was mentioned 
previously, the DoD was on pace to meet its goal as of June 1, 2003.  From this point, the 
DoD needed to follow the “projected” line to reach its goal of 226,000 positions 
competed by the end of FY2008.  As can be seen, through the end of FY2004, the DoD 
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Figure 3.   DoD A-76 Positions Completed (FY1997-2004) and OMB’s Goals (FY2002-
2008) 
 
Source: Author created from DOD Faces Challenges Implementing its Core Competency 
Approach and Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy  
 
Serious questions have been raised as to whether the DoD components can in fact 
identify the expected number of positions for competition and then complete those 
competitions in the anticipated time frame154. 
4. Results 
 The authors find that OMB’s aggressive outsourcing targets have had some 
negative results within the DoD.  These results include small and inefficient outsourcing 
competitions, overstated cost savings, and a strain on acquisition personnel.  Because the 
DoD is judged on its ability to meet OMB’s targets, the DoD has focused its attention on 
the easiest outsourcing initiatives to post maximum results with minimum effort, rather  
 
 
                                                 
154 Susan M. Gates, and Albert A. Robbert. Personnel Savings in Competitively Sourced DoD 
Activities: Are they Real? Will they Last?. RAND, 2000. 
 47
than focus on those competitions that are in the best interest of the unit or service.  In 
particular, the DoD has completed mostly small competitions that receive less scrutiny 
and require fewer resources than larger competitions.   
We can deduce the size of the competitions by combining two unique pieces of 
information.  We know that private contractors currently win about 60% of the 
competitions, with the government MEO’s winning the remainder155.  However, the 
MEO won 89% of the 17,595 positions competed in FY2003156 and 90% of the 12,573 
positions competed in FY2004157.  The most logical explanation is that most of the 
competitions are small and are won by contractors.  At the same time, there are a few 
large competitions that are won by the government.  This would explain how contractors 
can manage to win a majority of the competitions, but so few of the positions.   
 In the time between when the PMA was introduced in 2001 and August 2004, the 
DoD completed 501 A-76 initiatives, totaling 37,986 positions, which it claims generated 
$5.2B, or 36%, in savings158.  However, because the majority of the competitions were so 
small, it can be assumed that these competitions generated a large ratio of expenses per 
position to compete and probably led to highly overstated cost-savings estimates.   
 The aggressive outsourcing targets have also created a strain on acquisition 
personnel.  On March 19, 2003 the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support asked the following question to 
David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States: 
Would you agree that the challenges of meeting the Administration’s goals 
for public-private competition, and of managing services contracts that 
result from such competition, are more likely to require an increase in 
acquisition resources than a decrease159?  
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On May 23, 2003, Walker responded with the following: 
The Administration’s goals for conducting public-private competitions 
could have a significant impact on the acquisition workforce in a number 
of ways.  First, as noted by the Commercial Activities Panel, the current 
process for conducting these competitions are complicated, and therefore 
requires a skilled acquisition workforce to support the studies.   
 
Second, the number of positions proposed for study in the coming years is 
significantly higher than in the past, greatly increasing the competitive 
sourcing workload at many agencies.  At DoD, for example, the number of 
positions proposed for study during the next five years is double what the 
department had been able to review between fiscal years 1997 and 2002.   
 
Finally, to the extent that an increase in competitive sourcing studies result 
in an increase in the award of service contracts to the private sector, 
agencies will need to ensure that they have sufficient acquisition 
workforce in numbers and abilities to administer those contracts 
effectively160. 
 
Since there has not been a substantial increase in the number of acquisition 
personnel since this testimony, we can assume that this problem is still lingering and that 
the DoD will not be able to increase the number of competitions conducted each year 
unless it is given the necessary resources to do so. 
F. PROBLEMS WITH OUTSOURCING COMPETITIONS 
1. Introduction 
To date, the DoD has encountered several challenges with its outsourcing process.  
These challenges include poor cost estimates, problems with contracts, making decisions 
based on lowest cost versus best value, conflicts of interest, competition delays, and a 
shortage of personnel manning and expertise. 
2. Poor Cost Estimates  
 From Section D of this chapter we know that DoD cost-savings estimates are 
usually high and are often the result of poorly defined work requirements and insufficient 
Performance Work Statements.  After the requirement is outsourced, costs often increase 
as the contract is modified to add work that was not included in the original contract.  We 
also know that the outsourcing agencies often fail to include acquisition, investment, and 
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transition costs in their analysis.  In addition, baseline cost estimates are often erroneous 
and accurate post-award or MEO cost savings are difficult to determine because of 
deficiencies in the CAMIS database system.    
 There is also debate over the minimum cost differential requirement, which 
requires the contractor bid to be at least 10% or $10M, whichever is lower, less than the 
government estimate, and the 12% overhead rate.  Defense contractors claim that both of 
these factors give the government an advantage in the outsourcing process. 
 We also know that the impact of high cost-savings estimates can be devastating to 
the DoD.  When the agencies fail to include all of the A-76 costs in their projections, the 
cost savings are often less than the estimates and create funding shortfalls within the 
DoD.   
3. Problems with Contracts  
 The DoD has experienced several problems with its outsourcing contracts.  On 
March 10, 2000, the DoD Office of the Inspector General published the results of an 
audit of all service contracts for professional, administrative, and management support 
activities.  The report revealed that the 15 contracting and program offices included in the 
study were not adequately managing the award and administration of their 105 
contracts161.  In fact, every contract had one or more of the following problems: 
- Inadequate government cost estimates (77%); 
- Non-use of prior history to define requirements (69%); 
- Inadequate pricing negotiation memorandums (68%); 
- Inadequate contract surveillance (67%); 
- Inadequate competition (60%); 
- Cursory technical reviews (57%); 
- Lack of cost control (25%); 
- Failure to award multiple-award contracts (18%). 
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The report also revealed that cost-type contracts, which place a higher risk on the 
government, continued without question for the same services for inordinate lengths of 
time (39 years in one extreme case) and there were no performance measures in use to 
judge the efficiency and effectiveness of the services rendered.   
4. Lowest Cost versus Best Value 
 Until recently, the DoD focused almost exclusively on cost avoidance in the 
implementation of A-76 and did not necessarily consider a “best value” approach, which 
includes a combination of price, quality and performance, to competitive sourcing.  In 
fact, GAO noted that the A-76 process has not worked well as the basis for competitions 
that work to identify the best provider in terms of quality, innovation, flexibility, and 
reliability162.   
OMB is trying to change the low-cost mentality and provided more emphasis on 
best-value procurement in the 2003 A-76 revision.  However, since there is still so much 
emphasis placed on cost savings, it is doubtful that we will see much of a shift in the near 
future.  This cynical outlook is commonly held by many contractors.  In general, they 
believe that government procurement specialists still decide contract awards based on the 
lowest cost, and not necessarily what would represent the best value to the 
government163.  In a 2004 interview, the Vice President for Business Development at an 
unnamed Fortune 100 company stated that: 
Best value has a very subjective definition.  We find there is much less 
attention paid to efficiencies, and ultimately the decisions are made solely 
on the basis of low cost, even where they say it is a best-value 
procurement164. 
 
5. Conflicts of Interest  
 In the fall of 1998, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base released a Request for 
Proposal for maintenance, operation, repair, and minor construction services for the base 
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and subsequently received two proposals.  The Air Force reviewed the proposals, 
determined that they were incomplete and unacceptable, and then canceled the original 
solicitation.  The contractors filed protests with the GAO.   
 After concluding their investigation, GAO stated:        
[The contractors] argue that the determination that their proposals were 
technically unacceptable - that is, the determination on which cancellation 
of the solicitation was based - resulted from a failure to conduct 
meaningful discussions, and an unreasonable evaluation of technical 
proposals by evaluators with an improper conflict of interest.  In this latter 
regard, the protestors note that 14 of 16 evaluators - 4 of 6 core evaluators 
responsible for evaluating the entire proposals, and all 10 technical 
advisors responsible for evaluating specific portions of the proposals - 
held positions that were under study as part of the A-76 study165. 
 
 The GAO concluded by stating that “We agree with the protestors that the 
evaluation process was fundamentally flawed as a result of a conflict of interest.” 
 The vice president mentioned in the previous subsection also witnessed a similar 
situation.  In the fall of 2003, he and several other industry representatives were visiting a 
site in New Jersey that was being competed under A-76.  As their tour of the facilities 
progressed, it became apparent that the tour guide was withholding needed information.  
At one point he even cancelled an entire portion of the tour, citing an obscure regulation 
that prevented the industry representatives from entering the area.  In the end, it was 
revealed that the tour guide was one of the people whose job was being competed.   
  Unfortunately, stories like these are more commonplace than one may like to 
believe.  It is because of situations like this that new rules to govern conflicts of interest 
were added during the 2003 A-76 revision.  In particular, the new rules contain 
provisions that bar directly-affected government personnel, defined as personnel whose 
job is being competed, from participation “in any manner” on the Source Selection 
Evaluation Board.  They also state that members of the government team that develop the 
PWS may not also be members of the government team that develop the MEO, thus 
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reducing the possibility of requirements tailoring166.  Since the rules are still relatively 
new, more time is needed to determine their impact. 
6. Competition Delays 
 Because the DoD’s A-76 studies have typically taken longer than originally 
planned, they have also used more resources and cost more to complete than originally 
planned167.  To shorten the time required to conduct a competition, the 2003 revision to 
the A-76 Circular states that standard competitions shall not exceed 12 months from 
public announcement (start date) to performance decision (end date), with 6 month 
extensions granted under certain conditions.  However, the studies, historically, have 
taken substantially longer than 12-18 months.  In fact, single-function studies have taken 
an average of 20 months, and multi-function studies have taken 35 months168.  Without 
an increase in the number of personnel assigned to the competitions or a more 
streamlined process, it seems nearly impossible for the DoD to meet this new timeline.             
 The A-76 Circular also states that agencies shall complete certain preliminary 
planning - such as work scope, baseline costs, and schedule - before public 
announcement169.  Only when these tasks are completed and the public announcement is 
issued, will the clock start ticking.   
Since it is not clear how much time this preliminary planning has taken in the 
past170, it is impossible to know how much, if at all, the timeline will be shortened 
because of this change.  But the change may actually lengthen the process.  Since the 
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preliminary planning is no longer part of the official timeline, this initial stage of the 
process may not be very visible or receive much scrutiny and outside oversight.  If this 
occurs, the agencies may not devote their full attention to the competition, allowing the 
planning stage to drag on indefinitely.   
7. Acquisition Personnel Manning and Expertise  
 Between fiscal years 1990 and 2001, DoD’s acquisition workforce was reduced 
by more than 50%.  At the same time, DoD’s contracting workload increased by 12%171 
due to increased reliance on services provided by commercial firms, changes to the 
federal acquisition process, and the introduction and expansion of alternative contracting 
approaches172.  In February 2000, the Inspector General identified a number of adverse 
impacts attributable to these reductions in the DoD workforce.  They include: 
- Increased backlogs in closing out completed contracts; 
- Increased program costs resulting from contracting for technical support 
versus in-house technical support; 
- Insufficient personnel to fill in for employees on deployments; 
- Insufficient staff to manage requirements, reduced scrutiny and timeliness 
in reviewing acquisition actions, personnel retention difficulty; 
- Increased procurement action lead time; 
- Lost opportunities to develop cost savings initiatives173.   
It should be noted that this list was prepared prior to September 11, 2001.  We can 
only speculate the impact that Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and the broader Global War On Terrorism have had on the DoD acquisition community.       
 In addition to an increased workload, contracting specialists today must also have 
a greater knowledge of market conditions, industry trends, and the technical details of the 
commodities and services they procure.  In the end, the DoD has had difficulty adjusting 
to the significant changes in the federal acquisition environment and has experienced 
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particular difficulty improving its acquisition of services and ensuring the appropriate use 
of contracting techniques and approaches174.  As a result, GAO has continually 
designated DoD’s contract management as a high-risk area175. 
G. ALTERNATIVES TO A-76 
1. Introduction 
 There are numerous problems with the A-76 process and there have been many 
ideas and proposals offered for alternative ways to conduct government outsourcing.  
This section will summarize a few of these ideas.   
2. Commercial Activities Panel Recommendations 
 The Commercial Activities Panel was a congressionally-mandated, GAO-
convened panel to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial 
federal activities from government personnel to federal contractors176.  The Panel’s 
mission was “to improve the current sourcing framework and processes so they reflect a 
balance among taxpayer interests, government needs, employee rights, and contractor 
concerns”177. 
 On 30 April 2002 the Panel released its final report, which included four 
recommendations.  The first was the adoption of ten guiding principles for federal 
sourcing policy.  They included:  
- Support agency missions, goals, and objectives; 
- Be consistent with human capital practices designed to attract, motivate, 
retain, and reward a high-performing federal workforce; 
- Recognize that inherently governmental and certain other functions should 
be performed by federal workers; 
- Create incentives and processes to foster high-performing, efficient, and 
effective organizations throughout the federal government; 
                                                 
174 United States General Accounting Office. March 19 Hearing on Sourcing and Acquisition: 
Questions for the Record. Washington, D.C:  2003. 
175 United States General Accounting Office. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: 
Department of Defense. Vol. GAO-03-98, January 2003. 
176 Valerie Bailey Grasso. Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy. Washington, D.C: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005. 
177 United States General Accounting Office. Commercial Activities Panel: Improving the Sourcing 
Decisions of the Federal Government. Vol. GAO-02-866T, June 26, 2002. 
 55
- Be based on a clear, transparent, and consistently applied process; 
- Avoid arbitrary full-time equivalent or other arbitrary numerical goals; 
- Establish a process that, for activities that may be performed by either the 
public or private sector, would permit public and private sources to 
participate in competitions for work currently performed in-house, work 
currently contracted to the private sector, and new work, consistent with 
these guiding principles; 
- Ensure that, when competitions are held, they are conducted as fairly, 
effectively, and efficiently as possible; 
- Ensure that competitions involve a process that considers both quality and 
cost factors; 
- Provide for accountability in connection with all sourcing decisions178. 
The remaining three recommendations were the abolishment of OMB Circular A-
76, replacing it with an “integrated competition process” that combines elements of OMB 
Circular A-76 with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); the implementation of 
limited changes to the Circular that do not require legislation; and the move to develop 
federal agencies into high-performing organizations, known as HPO’s179. 
3. Senior Executive Council Recommendations 
 The Senior Executive Council is a high-level management committee which was 
established in 2001 to help guide efforts across the DoD to transform and improve the 
department’s business practices, and to function as a board of directors.  The Council is 
chaired by the Secretary of Defense and is comprised of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
the service secretaries, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics180. 
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 One of the business-transformation initiatives that have been endorsed by the 
Council is a core competency-based approach for making sourcing decisions - that is, 
making sourcing decisions based on whether the function is core to the agency’s 
warfighting missions.  In April 2002, the Council launched a DoD-wide effort to 
distinguish between core and non-core functions with an emphasis on retaining in-house 
only those functions deemed core to the warfighting mission.  Under this approach, the 
Council tasked the defense components with developing plans to transition non-core 
functions to alternative sourcing arrangements or A-76 studies, if appropriate, as soon as 
possible181.   
 The Council noted that A-76 cost comparisons are lengthy, expensive, and hard 
on the workforce.  It recommended that the DoD use alternative arrangements such as 
public-private partnering, employee stock ownership, and quasi-governmental 
organizations182.   
4. Come As You Are Competition 
 An idea proposed by RAND is to broaden A-76 incentives to all commercial 
activities, not just those identified for study, by requiring all activities to compete on a 
“come as you are” basis183.  Under this approach, the organization in place at the time a 
study is announced would compete against the best private-sector bid.   
Since a competition could be announced at any time, this approach would force 
managers to continually evaluate their organizations and implement measures to increase 
efficiency.  This incentive to improve efficiency would even be amplified because the 
activities that make themselves more efficient would not only fare better if eventually 
competed, but they would also face a lower probability of having to undergo an A-76 
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competition in the first place184.  In addition, the authors of the plan wrote that “when all 
in-house commercial activities face a weaker incentive to become efficient, the [cost] 
savings might be greater than when only a subset of commercial activities, identified for 
A-76 studies, face a somewhat stronger incentive185.” 
5. Transaction Cost Economics  
 According to Craig Powell, the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) concepts of 
asset specificity, complexity, and frequency can provide DoD personnel with a powerful 
tool to evaluate outsourcing actions186.  He believes that providing TCE training to 
acquisition personnel would provide a better understanding of the economic forces that 
are at work in the outsourcing process.  This training would not be a replacement for 
training in current DoD and service-specific acquisition guidelines, but would rather 
complement existing training.   
There is often a conflict of goals between the participants in the outsourcing 
process.  Integrating the principles of TCE into the outsourcing process could help all of 
the participants to overcome their different goals and perspectives and establish uniform 
criteria to evaluate the A-76 function under study.  For this to occur, the training would 
need to extend past acquisition personnel, such as comptrollers and contracting officers, 
and include the leaders of the organization undergoing the A-76 study.   
6. Improving Efficiency without Competition 
 A completely different alternative to the A-76 process is to not outsource a 
function, but rather to improve its efficiency without competition.  RAND claims that the 
local commanders and local functional managers have the detailed process knowledge 
required to identify opportunities for cost savings, but also face the strongest 
disincentives to undertake change187.  The DoD could use both individual and 
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organizational rewards to prompt change.  This would give the managers and their 
workforces an opportunity to earn performance, gainsharing, or goalsharing bonuses for 
their cost-saving effort.  In addition, the organizations could be allowed to use a portion 
of the cost savings to pay for their top unfunded requirements.  Another option is to have 
DoD performance evaluations explicitly consider the extent to which managers identified 
and implemented cost saving measures188. 
7. Summary 
 This section is not an all-inclusive listing of the many ideas and proposals offered 
for alternate ways to conduct government outsourcing.  Rather, its intent is to show that 
there are different ways, besides the A-76 process, to accomplish outsourcing and 
improve organizational efficiency.  While we give more credence to some ideas over 
others, they all deserve merit for being innovative and diverging from standard thinking.  
Unfortunately, the ideas mentioned in this chapter are moot.  Until the OMB rescinds its 
goal to conduct A-76 competitions, it is unlikely that the DoD will pursue any alternate 
forms of outsourcing on a large scale.   
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III. DATA 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The Air Force base from which we obtained information is located within the 
United States; possesses several flying squadrons, both airlift and fighter; and has over 
7,400 personnel assigned to it.  At the time of this particular competition, the Air Force 
was wrapping up an overall restructuring of the supply system.  The supply squadron, 
prior to its outsourcing, was responsible for general supply services on the base to include 
the following: requisition, receiving, inspecting, storing, issuing, delivering, shipping, 
transferring, and disposal of supplies and equipment assets for the wing customers, tenant 
units, contractor operated sites, and transient customers of the base.  In the case of the 
contractor who won by the outsourcing process, they were to continue providing these 
same services as specified in the contract.  The outsourcing process was conducted 
according to OMB Circular A-76 guidelines in place at the time in an attempt to cut costs 
of a function that was not considered inherently governmental.  The end result was 
anticipated compounded cost savings from both the supply restructuring effort and 
decreased costs associated with the base level operations being competed via A-76 
procedures.   
B. EXPLANATION OF SOURCES OF DATA 
The sources of cost data are varied for the analysis of outsourcing actions being 
studied.  The budget office of the Comptroller Squadron (CPTS) for the base which is 
being analyzed provided information on the actual obligations incurred by the Wing 
(WG) for the years the contract was in effect: the last four months of Fiscal Year 2001 
(FY01) through the last option year of the contract, Fiscal Year 2005 (FY05).  The 
forecasted obligations of the new contract put in place in Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) was 
also provided along with the obligations for the Supply Squadron (SUPS) for the ten 
fiscal years prior to the outsourcing contract going into full effect: Fiscal Years 1991-




of expense.  Examples include Civilian Pay, Supplies, Temporary Duty Travel (TDY), 
etc.  Each of these categories falls under the overarching Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) appropriation.   
The office responsible for conducting an A-76 study, Manpower (MO), currently 
falls under the Mission Support Squadron (MSS) of the Wing being studied.  Cost data 
related to the A-76 study were accomplished and supplied by the MO office.  Data 
requiring analysis provided by MO was a synopsis of the costs to the government if the 
Most Efficient Organization were to accomplish the work using 100% government 
personnel and assets, in other words, no work activities contracted out to a third party.  
MO also provided much of the cost comparison data since they are responsible for 
accomplishing the A-76 study.  Therefore, their comparison data also included costs that 
would be incurred by the government if the operations are contracted out.  These 
comparative costs for the contract are summarized numbers showing the total costs in 
broad categories, with the specifics for the costs embedded within the contract itself. 
A third office, the Contracting Squadron (CONS), is responsible for soliciting, 
negotiating, and finally awarding the contract, if it provides the requisite cost savings to 
the government.  The CONS within the Wing provided the more detailed information 
regarding the costs embedded within the broad categories of the contract.  The somewhat 
detailed information describing the service to be provided and the costs associated with it 
is contained within the various contracting documents and their modifications.  In-depth 
information is considered proprietary and therefore not available for this analysis. 
Finally, the most recently released inflation factors (dated 20 January 2006) for 
normalizing the data to a constant year were obtained through the office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Cost and Economics (SAF/FMC).  Provided 
annually for cost analyses, the inflation factors allow for the normalization of cost data 
from one year to another and are broken down by major cost categories.  These inflation 
factors allow analysis of a particular cost category, such as civilian pay, by taking into 




costs covering a number of fiscal years can all be converted to a constant value of one 
particular year, allowing a comparison of apples to apples and showing true cost growth 
or decreases.  
C. METHODOLOGY OF ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
Using the data provided by the various units mentioned earlier, three methods of 
analysis are used to help determine whether or not the Air Force saved money by 
outsourcing supply functions at the base being studied.  These three cost comparison 
methods are as follows: 
1)  Compare the Actual Annual Costs prior to outsourcing with the Actual Annual 
Costs after outsourcing 
2)  Compare the Actual Annual Costs after outsourcing to a estimate of what it 
would have cost to maintain the operations as-is  
3)  Compare the Actual Annual Costs after outsourcing versus the Anticipated 
Annual Costs of the contract as determined in the outsourcing process 
Each of these methods of analysis will provide a slightly different perspective on 
whether the Air Force achieved the cost savings sought through the outsourcing process.  
An assumption being made, which allows for a more simplified analysis of this 
outsourcing action, is that the military personnel costs are not going away.  Mentioned 
earlier in Chapter II, outsourcing competitions do not necessarily result in a decrease in 
military positions189.  Therefore, military personnel costs are not included as part of this 
analysis for either costs savings achieved through their elimination or their costs incurred 
by re-training and shuffling to another function.  In the end, military personnel costs are 
irrelevant since it is most likely that they will simply be shuffled from the function being 
outsourced to another area (not necessarily at the same base), thus resulting in no true 
cost savings.  Savings in military positions seem to occur for the base since the positions 
come off the Wing’s roster of military positions.  These same military members, 
                                                 
189 Susan M. Gates, and Albert A. Robbert. Personnel Savings in Competitively Sourced DoD 
Activities: Are they Real? Will they Last?. RAND, 2000. 
 62
however, have enlistments and commissions which have to be honored like a contract 
itself and leads to their reassignments elsewhere within the Air Force. 
a. Pre-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Post-Outsourcing 
Actual Annual Costs  
Comparing and analyzing the pre-outsourcing actual annual costs with the 
post-outsourcing actual annual costs is likely the easiest of the three methods being used 
to determine whether or not the Air Force saved money by outsourcing this particular 
supply squadron.  This analysis will look at the costs associated with the supply squadron 
both with the effects of inflation (nominal cost growth) and with inflation factored in 
(real cost growth).  The analysis will then compare the obligations incurred one year to 
the obligations of another.  Obviously, common sense in the analysis provides that if 
there is a decrease in obligations from a previous year to a future year, funds were saved 
and the outsourcing at least partially achieved its goal.  To determine whether or not 
outsourcing met the overall goal of saving money for the Air Force, the entire time period 
studied for outsourcing competition must be considered, but historical data from the prior 
ten years will also provide some insight to the trends occurring at the time of the 
outsourcing.  Table 1 summarizes the nominal costs to be compared and analyzed against 
one another: 
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Summary of Pre-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY91-FY00) and Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY01-FY05)
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
Civilian Pay: 412,720$               1,858,609$            1,933,273$           1,833,875$            1,864,373$                
Fuels:  $                34,731 41,991$                 45,496$                51,186$                 44,393$                     
660,908$               439,564$               1,020,972$           605,150$               515,082$                   
Total: 1,108,359$            2,340,164$            2,999,741$           2,490,211$            2,423,848$                
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99  FY00 
Civilian Pay: 1,849,685$            1,916,831$            2,034,485$           1,848,854$            1,848,860$                
Fuels: 45,905$                 53,101$                 59,460$                65,710$                  $                    44,005 
465,413$               611,246$               976,383$              441,661$               534,022$                   
Total: 2,361,003$            2,581,178$            3,070,328$           2,356,225$            2,426,887$                
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Civilian Pay: 1,582,258$            3,657$                   -$                      -$                       -$                           
Fuels: 61,761$                 3,299$                   7,183$                  8,858$                   11,134$                     
1,403,175$            3,631,431$            4,147,795$           4,979,256$            5,773,928$                
Total: 3,047,194$            3,638,387$            4,154,978$           4,988,114$            5,785,062$                
All other Operations and Maintenance:
All other Operations and Maintenance:
All other Operations and Maintenance:
 
Table 1.   Summary of Pre-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY91-FY00) and Post-
outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY01-FY05) 
 
The methods for adjusting the above nominal costs to real costs will be 
discussed in the next section since it is the sole basis for the analysis there.   
b. Post-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Estimated Cost to 
Have Remained “In-House” 
Post-outsourcing actual annual costs will be compared to the estimated 
cost to have remained “in-house” by incorporating the SAF/FMC inflation factors, 
thereby providing real cost growth (versus nominal).  This method of analysis will 
compare the actual annual cost after the outsourcing action to the cost it would have 
likely cost the Air Force to have simply allowed the squadron to continue operating as-is 
with the annual obligations simply keeping up with inflation.  For this comparison, Fiscal 
Year 2000 will be the year all the numbers are normalized to since this corresponds to the 
last full fiscal year with no outsourcing costs associated.  Cost categories will be broken 
into three areas for which cost data was provided and for which there are inflation indices 
specifically for these areas: Civilian Pay, Fuels, and Other Operations and Maintenance.   
 
 64
Comparing costs in these categories offers the most visible way to see if funds were 
saved since it all pertains to transactions visible and under the control of the budget office 
for the function being outsourced. 
Inflation indices for the categories above are summarized in Table 2: 
Conversion Factors to Constant FY 2000 Dollars (rounded to nearest .001)
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
Civilian Pay: 0.742 0.773 0.803 0.829 0.853
Fuels: 1.328 1.131 1.147 1.309 1.146
All other Operations and Maintenance: 0.850 0.874 0.898 0.916 0.933
FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00
Civilian Pay: 0.876 0.900 0.926 0.957 1.000
Fuels: 1.211 1.226 1.468 1.339 1.000 
All other Operations and Maintenance: 0.952 0.972 0.978 0.986 1.000
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Civilian Pay: 1.040 1.085 1.131 1.178 1.221
Fuels: 1.629 1.613 1.355 1.467 1.951
All other Operations and Maintenance: 1.018 1.026 1.036 1.057 1.087
 
Table 2.   Conversion Factors to Constant FY 2000 Dollars 
 
To illustrate how these indices are used, assume there is $100 in Civilian 
Pay allocated in FY00.  In order to keep up with inflation within the Civilian Pay 
account, the $100 in FY00 will have the same value as $104.02 in FY01 ($100 * 1.040 = 
$104.00).  Likewise, an example working backwards is given.  Assume there is $100 in 
FY03 dollars in the Civilian Pay account and it is desired to know what it is worth in 
FY00 dollars.  The resulting value in FY00 dollars is $88.39 ($100/1.131 = $88.42).  
Doing these calculations for the cost data provided allows us to compare constant dollars 
across the board.  In this case, it will be constant FY00 dollars. 
Table 3 shows the estimated real costs, in terms of both historic and future 
years (Constant FY00 dollars), with FY00 as the baseline: 
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Estimated Costs for Past and Future Based on FY00 data (In FY00 $)
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98
Civilian Pay (FY00 Base Rate):  $      1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860  $     1,848,860 
Civilian Pay Inflation Multiplier: 0.742 0.773 0.803 0.829 0.853 0.876 0.900 0.926
Civilian Pay Required In Particular 
Fiscal Years (FY00 $): 1,371,670$       1,428,882$      1,483,851$      1,532,640$      1,577,899$      1,618,688$      1,664,772$      1,712,351$      
Fuels (FY00 Base Rate):  $           44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005 
Fuels Inflation Multiplier: 1.328 1.131 1.147 1.309 1.146 1.211 1.226 1.468
Fuels Funding Required In Particular 
Fiscal Years (FY00 $): 58,419$            49,773$           50,470$           57,586$           50,445$           53,270$           53,963$           64,593$           
All other Operations and Maintenance 
(FY00 Base Rate):  $         534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022  $        534,022 
All other Operations and 
Maintenance Inflation Multiplier: 0.850 0.874 0.898 0.916 0.933 0.952 0.972 0.978
All other Operations and Maintenance 
Funding Required In Particular Fiscal 
Years (FY00 $): 454,012$          466,724$         479,326$         488,912$         498,202$         508,166$         518,837$         522,469$         
Total Funds Required (FY00 $): 1,884,101$       1,945,379$      2,013,647$      2,079,139$      2,126,546$      2,180,124$      2,237,572$      2,299,414$      
 
Estimated Costs for Past and Future Based on FY00 data (In FY00 $) Continued
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Civilian Pay (FY00 Base Rate): 1,848,860$        1,848,860$      1,848,860$       1,848,860$     1,848,860$      1,848,860$        1,848,860$        
Civilian Pay Inflation Multiplier: 0.957 1.000 1.040 1.085 1.131 1.178 1.221
Civilian Pay Required In Particular 
Fiscal Years (FY00 $): 1,770,023$        1,848,860$      1,923,129$       2,006,612$     2,091,752$      2,177,514$        2,257,451$        
Fuels (FY00 Base Rate):  $            44,005  $          44,005  $           44,005  $          44,005  $          44,005  $             44,005  $            44,005 
Fuels Inflation Multiplier: 1.339 1.000 1.629 1.613 1.355 1.467 1.951
Fuels Funding Required In Particular 
Fiscal Years (FY00 $):
 $            58,909  $          44,005  $           71,684  $          70,967  $          59,613  $             64,560  $            85,865 
All other Operations and Maintenance 
(FY00 Base Rate): 534,022$           534,022$         534,022$          534,022$        534,022$         534,022$           534,022$           
All other Operations and 
Maintenance Inflation Multiplier: 0.986 1.000 1.018 1.026 1.036 1.057 1.087
All other Operations and Maintenance 
Funding Required In Particular Fiscal 
Years (FY00 $): 526,649$           534,022$         543,634$          547,983$        553,463$         564,533$           580,339$           
Total Funds Required (FY00 $): 2,355,581$        2,426,887$      2,538,447$       2,625,562$     2,704,828$      2,806,607$        2,923,655$        
 
Table 3.   Estimated Costs for Past and Future Based on FY00 data  
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Table 3 allows the comparison of both future and historic years to a 
common baseline.  Furthermore, it can also show the future growth compared to what 
“should have been” and to the historic actual to highlight any large deviations from 
history.  In order to provide a basis for comparison of “apples to apples,” Table 4 gives 
the calculations for the post-outsourcing actual annual costs adjusted for inflation to 
provide numbers that are given in FY00 dollars: 
Actual Annual Costs in FY 00 Dollars 
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98
Actual Civilian Pay: 412,720$               1,858,609$             1,933,273$             1,833,875$            1,864,373$            1,849,685$            1,916,831$            2,034,485$            
Civilian Pay Inflation 
Multiplier: 0.742 0.773 0.803 0.829 0.853 0.876 0.900 0.926
Civilian Pay Required
In Future Years (FY00 $): 556,301$               2,404,892$             2,408,834$             2,212,246$            2,184,528$            2,112,704$            2,128,791$            2,196,674$            
Actual Fuel Cost: 34,731$                 41,991$                  45,496$                  51,186$                 44,393$                 45,905$                 53,101$                 59,460$                 
Fuels Inflation Multiplier: 1.328 1.131 1.147 1.309 1.146 1.211 1.226 1.468
Fuels Funding Required
In Future Years (FY00 $): 26,162$                 37,125$                  39,669$                  39,115$                 38,726$                 37,921$                 43,302$                 40,508$                 
All other Operations
and Maintenance Costs: 660,908$               439,564$                1,020,972$             605,150$               515,082$               465,413$               611,246$               976,383$               
All other Operations and
Maintenance Inflation Multiplier: 0.850 0.874 0.898 0.916 0.933 0.952 0.972 0.978
All other Operations and Maintenance
Funding Required In Future 
Years (FY00 $): 777,379$               502,945$                1,137,476$             660,984$               552,116$               489,094$               629,135$               997,973$               
Total Funds Required (FY00 $): 1,359,842$            2,944,963$             3,585,978$             2,912,345$            2,775,369$            2,639,719$            2,801,229$            3,235,155$            
Actual Annual Costs in FY 00 Dollars Continued
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Actual Civilian Pay: 1,848,854$          1,848,860$            1,582,258$            3,657$                   -$                       -$                      -$                     
Civilian Pay Inflation
Multiplier: 0.957 1.000 1.040 1.085 1.131 1.178 1.221
Civilian Pay Required
In Future Years (FY00 $): 1,931,202$          1,848,860$            1,521,153$            3,370$                   -$                       -$                      -$                     
Actual Fuel Cost: 65,710$               44,005$                 61,761$                 3,299$                   7,183$                   8,858$                  11,134$                
Fuels Inflation Multiplier: 1.339 1.000 1.629 1.613 1.355 1.467 1.951
Fuels Funding Required
In Future Years (FY00 $): 49,085$               44,005$                 37,913$                 2,046$                   5,302$                   6,038$                  5,706$                  
All other Operations
and Maintenance Costs: 441,661$             534,022$               1,403,175$            3,631,431$            4,147,795$            4,979,256$           5,773,928$           
All other Operations and
Maintenance Inflation Multiplier: 0.986 1.000 1.018 1.026 1.036 1.057 1.087
All other Operations and Maintenance
Funding Required In Future Years
(FY00 $): 447,844$             534,022$               1,378,364$            3,538,910$            4,002,097$            4,710,149$           5,313,105$           
Total Funds Required (FY00 $): 2,428,132$          2,426,887$            2,937,431$            3,544,325$            4,007,399$            4,716,186$           5,318,811$           
 
Table 4.   Actual Annual Costs in FY 00 Dollars 
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The data in the preceding tables will be used in further analysis in the 
following chapter. 
c. Post-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Anticipated 
Contractual Costs  
The final method of analysis is to compare the anticipated contractual 
costs at the time of contract award to the costs actually incurred by the Air Force to the 
post-outsourcing actual annual costs.  This method is straight-forward and simply 
compares the amount of the contract awarded to the obligations incurred by the 
government each year.  Since the contract is a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract, 
theoretically the price is semi-solidly set at award.  Furthermore, with a FFP contract the 
vast majority of risk is placed upon the contractor since the price to be paid by the 
government has been thoroughly negotiated and agreed upon.  Cost increases are then 
supposed to be absorbed by the contract, so long as the work being requested by the 
government is contained within the contract.  Work that is outside of the contract will 
require secondary negotiations and increased costs to the government.  This analysis does 
not require the use of any of the cost data prior to the outsourcing, so it will be ignored.  
Table 5 shows the anticipated contract costs with no apparent estimate included in them 
for future inflation compared to the actual costs incurred over the period: 
 
Anticipated Contract Costs versus Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs
FY01 (2 months 
transition-Jun/Jul + 2 
months-Aug/Sep) FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total
Anticipated Contract 
Costs: 1,241,801.89$              3,570,300.26$     3,575,999.22$   3,575,999.22$      3,575,999.22$     15,540,099.81$         
Actual Contract Costs:  $              1,237,146.00 3,628,830.00$     4,147,795.00$   4,979,256.00$      5,773,928.00$     19,766,955.00$         
Difference: 4,655.89$                     (58,529.74)$        (571,795.78)$     (1,403,256.78)$    (2,197,928.78)$    (4,226,855.19)$         
 
Table 5.   Anticipated Contract Costs versus Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs 
 
There is one important item to note when comparing Table 5 to Table 1.  From Table 1, 
the category “All other Operations and Maintenance” for years FY01 to FY05 is 
composed entirely of contract costs.  These numbers then directly translate to the “Actual 
 68
Contract Costs” in Table 5, indicating that there are no additional costs in the “All other 
Operations and Maintenance” category of Table 1 combined with the contract costs 






A. ANALYSIS OF COSTS OF OUTSOURCING 
1. Summary of Outsourcing Results as Conducted through the A-76 
Process 
Before going straight into comparing and analyzing costs in the manner described 
in the previous chapter, it is probably useful to provide a background of the actual A-76 
competition results that are now the subject of our scrutiny.  Since the majority of the 
cost comparison data used in an A-76 competition revolves around personnel costs, our 
background will use this as a starting point.  The supply squadron being outsourced had 
208 total DoD positions that were outsourced, consisting of seven officers, 168 enlisted 
personnel, and 33 civilians.  Through the A-76 study, it was determined that the MEO for 
the government would consist of 97.75 full-time equivalent civilians.  From the 
documents disclosed, it was not apparent how many personnel the winning contractor 
would be using to fulfill the workload, as this would be too detailed and considered 
proprietary information.   
As a result of the A-76 competition, the MEO had an estimated cost of 
$28,620,082 over the period of time considered.  Over the same period of time, the 
contract price determined in the competition was estimated to have a cost of $16,630,702.  
A minimum conversion differential of $2,422,751, which is equivalent to 10% of the 
MEO’s personnel costs, was added to the estimated contract cost to give an adjusted total 
cost of $19,053,453.  This adjusted total cost of the contract is what is compared to the 
MEO cost to determine cost savings, in this case the savings were estimated at 
$9,566,629 ($28,620,082 - $19,053,453).  Since the cost savings are positive with the 
10% of the MEO’s personnel costs already considered, the contractor won the 
competition for exceeding the 10% threshold (and nearly the $10 million threshold as 
well) within the competition’s rules.  After the competition decision, other apparent cost 
savings within the contract appeared to be realized as the total amount of the FFP 
contract came in at $15,540,099.81 instead of the projected $16,630,702.  The contract 
cost was then spread out nearly evenly over the period of performance (see Table 5 in 
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Chapter III, Section 4 for the exact spread of contract costs) indicating no inflation effects 
in the future years.  Many of the factors involved in calculating both the MEO cost and 
the winning contract cost, as provided for in the A-76 guidelines, will be scrutinized more 
in the following sections.    
2. Pre-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Post-Outsourcing 
Actual Annual Costs 
a. Nominal Cost Analysis 
By looking at the data it is very apparent that there were significant 
increases in the amount of Air Force funding spent on the supply squadron being studied 
after the outsourcing occurred.  The nominal cost data will be first in this analysis and is 
reflected again to provide a convenient source for review as follows in Table 6: 
 
Summary of Pre-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY91-FY00) and Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY01-FY05)
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95
Civilian Pay: 412,720$               1,858,609$            1,933,273$           1,833,875$            1,864,373$                
Fuels:  $                34,731 41,991$                 45,496$                51,186$                 44,393$                     
660,908$               439,564$               1,020,972$           605,150$               515,082$                   
Total: 1,108,359$            2,340,164$            2,999,741$           2,490,211$            2,423,848$                
 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99  FY00 
Civilian Pay: 1,849,685$            1,916,831$            2,034,485$           1,848,854$            1,848,860$                
Fuels: 45,905$                 53,101$                 59,460$                65,710$                  $                    44,005 
465,413$               611,246$               976,383$              441,661$               534,022$                   
Total: 2,361,003$            2,581,178$            3,070,328$           2,356,225$            2,426,887$                
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Civilian Pay: 1,582,258$            3,657$                   -$                      -$                       -$                           
Fuels: 61,761$                 3,299$                   7,183$                  8,858$                   11,134$                     
1,403,175$            3,631,431$            4,147,795$           4,979,256$            5,773,928$                
Total: 3,047,194$            3,638,387$            4,154,978$           4,988,114$            5,785,062$                
All other Operations and Maintenance:
All other Operations and Maintenance:
All other Operations and Maintenance:
 
 
Table 6.   Summary of Pre-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY91-FY00) and Post-
outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (FY01-FY05) 
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At first look, the ten years prior to outsourcing (FY91-FY00) had some 
variability to the costs associated with the supply squadron from year to year.  To further 
illustrate this, Figure 4 shows the costs over the entire range from FY91-FY05: 





















Figure 4.   Actual Costs (nominal) by Fiscal Year  
 
Despite the obvious variability, the casual observer can conclude that 
more often than not, a cost of about $2.5 million could have been assumed for the 
squadron prior to outsourcing.  Doing the necessary statistical calculations on the first ten 
years, the data provides a mean cost of $2,415,794 and a median cost of $2,425,368 
proving the initial estimate of $2.5 million is not very far off the mark.  Furthermore, the 
median is within $2,000 of the FY00 actual costs and should support the use of that year 
as a basis for comparison.  Figure 4 shows the very apparent increase in nominal costs in 
the years after outsourcing, FY01-FY05. 
Looking further at the numbers provided in Table 6, it is readily apparent 
that the annual costs associated with the supply squadron more than doubled within five 
years from the time it was outsourced in FY00.  Further calculations show the actual 
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amount of funding required for the supply squadron increased by 138% within the first 
five years of being outsourced.  Using compounded interest over the five years, this 
would equate to an average annual increase of 18.97% per year.  This growth greatly 
exceeds the growth rate of 3% most people typically use to estimate inflation.  If the 
supply squadron had simply kept up with inflation over the next five years (calculated in 
a compounding manner), FY05 would only have required $2,813,427 to run operations as 
they were in FY00.  From this simple look at the pre-outsourcing actual annual costs 
compared to the post-outsourcing actual annual costs, it is seen that outsourcing this 
supply squadron did not necessarily save the Air Force any money. 
Looking more closely at the numbers associated with the contract itself, it 
may be beneficial to compare the increases from year to year.  This analysis should 
provide insight to any trends or to determine if the largest increases were later in the 
contract versus earlier on.  Using FY00 as a baseline figure because it is the last full year 
prior to the associated outsourcing costs, Table 7 provides the calculations showing cost 
increases each year for the supply squadron: 
Increases in Funding Required from Year to Year
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Arithmetic Mean 
of Cost Growth
Total: 2,426,887.00$    3,047,194.00$   3,638,387.00$    4,154,978.00$  4,988,114.00$    5,785,062.00$  
Cost Increase from Prior 
Year: 620,307.00$      591,193.00$       516,591.00$     833,136.00$       796,948.00$     
Percentage Increase 
from Prior Year: 25.6% 19.4% 14.2% 20.1% 16.0% 19.04%
 
Table 7.   Increases in Funding Required from Year to Year 
 
From the above calculations, the largest increase from one year to the next 
was from FY00 to FY01.  The most probable explanation for the large percentage 
increase in FY01 is likely due to the transition from government operations to contractor 
operations compared to a smaller baseline figure.  The contract for the operations of the 
supply squadron became effective for the last four months of FY01, which at first look 
really make one wonder how much the government was going to lose due to this 
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outsourcing process.  It is important to keep in mind that over the four month period, 
there are essentially twice as many people on hand for the squadron as normal so there is 
the necessary turnover and training taking place to allow as minimal an impact upon the 
rest of the base as possible.  This duplication of personnel is further explained by simply 
looking at the civilian pay costs in Table 6 and noting the decreased costs from FY00-
FY02 as the civilians on the books are phased out.   
Later nominal increases are much larger in scope than that for FY01, but 
do not provide the large percentage changes because the prior year’s baseline has become 
larger due to the increases in that particular year.  The end result of all of these increases 
is a compounding of costs increases, which is akin to the compounding effect of interest 
on a loan or investment.  This compounding effect provides cost growth that is linear by 
nature.  Table 8 summarizes the cumulative effect of the cost growth based on the 
nominal costs: 
 
Cumulative Effect of Cost Growth FY00-FY05
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Actual Costs 2,426,887$    3,047,194$     3,638,387$     4,154,978$        4,988,114$        5,785,062$        
Baseline Costs (FY00) 2,426,887$    2,426,887$     2,426,887$     2,426,887$        2,426,887$        2,426,887$        
Delta -$              620,307$        1,211,500$     1,728,091$        2,561,227$        3,358,175$        
Cumulative Cost Growth 0.0% 25.6% 49.9% 71.2% 105.5% 138.4%
 
Table 8.   Cumulative Effect of Cost Growth FY00-FY05 
 
Placing the information from Table 8 in graphical format, Figure 5 
emerges as follows: 
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Cumulative Growth as a Percentage
 
Figure 5.   Cumulative Effects of Nominal Cost Growth 
 
The increases in cost growth for FY00-FY05 provided an arithmetic 
average of 19.0%, which is very close to the compounded rate found earlier of 18.97%.  
Fortunately, there seems to be no real exponential increases in cost growth indicating a 
contractor who may have determined how to take advantage of the government in a legal 
manner and acted on it.  However, there is the constant increase in costs from year to year 
after the contract was awarded which greatly exceeds most reasonable expectations 
which could be explained by simple inflation.  By comparing the pre-outsourcing actual 
annual costs to the post-outsourcing actual annual costs in nominal terms, it is reasonable 
to conclude the Air Force did not reap the savings they anticipated. 
b. Real Cost Analysis 
To solidify whether or not the Air Force saved funds in the post-
outsourcing timeframe, nominal costs provide a start but are not necessarily the best for 
analysis.  Inflation does occur and it actually occurs somewhat differently across and  
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within various appropriations of the federal government.  The calculations for adjusting 
the nominal costs to real have already been accomplished in Chapter III and are 
summarized in Table 9: 
 
Fiscal Year
Actual Real Costs 
Incurred (FY00 $)
FY91 1,359,842$                    
FY92 2,944,963$                    
FY93 3,585,978$                    
FY94 2,912,345$                    
FY95 2,775,369$                    
FY96 2,639,719$                    
FY97 2,801,229$                    
FY98 3,235,155$                    
FY99 2,428,132$                   
FY00 2,426,887$                    
FY01 2,937,431$                    
FY02 3,544,325$                   
FY03 4,007,399$                    
FY04 4,716,186$                    
FY05 5,318,811$                    
Actual Annual Costs in FY 00 Dollars 
 
Table 9.   Actual Annual Costs in FY 00 Dollars 
 
The costs from the table above, normalized for inflation, show somewhat 
more volatility from year to year as compared to the nominal costs previously analyzed.  
This volatility, along with the deviation from the FY00 baseline as a percentage, can be 
seen in Figure 6: 
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Actual Real Costs Incurred (FY00 $)
Delta as Percentage of FY00 Baseline
 
Figure 6.   Real Costs Incurred in FY00 Dollars with Delta from Baseline 
 
Figure 6 shows an interesting trend in the real costs prior to outsourcing: 
in general, the costs associated with the supply squadron were decreasing over time.  The 
spike from FY91 to FY92 and FY93 can likely be explained by increased costs due to 
Operation Desert Storm.  Following this increase, there are several years of decreases 
from FY94-FY96 which are probably attributable to the budget cuts of President 
Clinton’s Administration.  The next two fiscal years, FY97 and FY98, show modest gains 
followed by further budget cutting in FY99 and FY00.  The years following these two 
fiscal years, FY01-FY05, show significant increases year after year with potentially no 
end in sight for future increases.  Of course, these fiscal years correspond to the same 
period of time the contract was in place for the operations of the supply squadron.  While 
it is much easier to analyze data after-the-fact versus predicting the future, there are likely 
few models which would have shown the same magnitude of cost increases from FY01-
FY05 had the government maintain operations “in-house.”  Again, by looking at the pre-
outsourcing actual annual costs to the post-outsourcing actual annual costs in real cost 
terms, it is reasonable to conclude the Air Force did not reap the savings they had 
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anticipated.  An analysis of whether or not the Air Force could have reaped saving by 
keeping the operations “in-house” is the next approach which will be explored. 
3. Post-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Estimated Cost to Have 
Remained “In-House” 
A look at the real cost data will provide the next basis for analysis.  Using the 
inflation factors as a guide for the inflation which would have occurred after FY00, we 
can compare what the supply squadron’s budget would have been if it had remained “in-
house.”   This can then be compared to the actual costs incurred over the period adjusted 
for inflation to bring all the data into constant FY00 dollars for a comparison of like 
costs.  This data, as calculated in Chapter III, is provided in the following table:  
 
Comparison of Estimated Cost to Remain "In-house" versus Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs (all figures in FY00 $)
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total
Estimated "In-house" Total 
Funds Required: 2,426,887$     2,538,447$     2,625,562$     2,704,828$        2,806,607$        2,923,655$        16,025,987$      
Post-outsourcing Actual 
Annual Costs Incurred: 2,426,887$     2,937,431$     3,544,325$     4,007,399$        4,716,186$        5,318,811$        20,524,152$      
Delta: (Projected - Actual)  $                 -    $       398,984  $        918,762  $       1,302,571  $       1,909,579  $       2,395,156  $       4,498,165 
Percent Over Estimated 
Annual "In-house" Cost: 0.00% 15.72% 34.99% 48.16% 68.04% 81.92% 28.07%
 
Table 10.   Comparison of Estimated Cost to Remain “In-house” versus Post-outsourcing 
Actual Annual Costs 
 
From the information in Table 10, it is readily apparent that the post-outsourcing 
actual annual costs exceeded the estimated costs to have simply kept the supply squadron 
operating as-is, with all numbers normalized to a constant FY00 dollar.  The divergence 
of the two estimates can be seen in Figure 7: 
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Post-outsourcing Actual Annual Costs
Incurred:
 
Figure 7.   Comparison of Costs to Remain “In-house” versus Actual Costs 
 
The growth over the period being studied was significant enough to lead to an 
overall cost growth of 28.07% over what the costs “should have been” had operations 
remained “in-house.”  Figure 7 shows the effect of this actual cost growth, year after 
year, resulting in the large difference between the estimate and the actual cost growth. 
Before going further, it is probably important to explain an assumption being 
made in these calculations.  For this analysis, there is the assumption that the squadron’s 
costs increased by the historic inflation factors year after year.  In actuality, it is 
extremely difficult to forecast what expenses would have been incurred by the unit.  The 
world of budgeting at the base level could have caused a decrease in what was funded 
within the squadron from one year to the next due to a civilian position vacancy or an 
overall cut to all units’ discretionary budgets.  On the other hand, some other independent 
variable within the unit may have arisen requiring significantly more funding than that 
projected.  Despite the simplicity of the calculations being accomplished, there are many 
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factors that could have caused many different “actual” scenarios to be played out, but 
assumptions are necessary to provide a common ground for analysis. 
Looking at the data in a similar manner to that of Section 2 above, it is possible to 
look at the cost growth from year to year for each of the two scenarios being analyzed 
within this section.  Table 11 shows this analysis: 
 
Increases in Funding Required from Year to Year (all numbers in constant FY00 $)




funds: 2,426,887.00$    2,538,447.25$   2,625,562.50$    2,704,828.10$  2,806,607.05$    2,923,655.43$  
Cost Increase from Prior 
Year: 111,560.25$      87,115.25$         79,265.60$       101,778.95$       117,048.38$     
Percentage Increase 
from Prior Year: 4.6% 3.4% 3.0% 3.8% 4.2% 3.80%
Actual Required funds: 2,426,887.00$    2,937,431.16$   3,544,324.87$    4,007,399.27$  4,716,186.20$    5,318,810.99$  
Cost Increase from Prior 
Year: 510,544.16$      606,893.71$       463,074.40$     708,786.93$       602,624.79$     
Percentage Increase 
from Prior Year: 21.0% 20.7% 13.1% 17.7% 12.8% 17.05%
 
Table 11.   Increases in Funding Required from Year to Year 
 
From the calculations above, it is apparent that had the operations for the supply 
squadron remained “in-house,” the arithmetic mean of the cost growth would have been 
fairly close to the assumed 3.0% inflation mentioned in Section 2 above.  Unfortunately, 
the actual costs incurred had growth rates that greatly exceeded those anticipated for 
having kept the operations “in-house.”  Again, FY01 cost growth can be explained 
somewhat by the duplicity of personnel required during the transition phase.  The cost 
growth that occurred in the later years will be explained in the next section.  The final 
conclusion to be drawn is that the Air Force did not realize the cost savings they 
anticipated through outsourcing.  
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4. Post-Outsourcing Actual Annual Costs versus Anticipated 
Contractual Costs 
Comparing the post-outsourcing actual annual costs to the anticipated annual 
costs provided in the awarded contract at the time of the outsourcing competition is likely 
the best comparison to make in order to explain cost increases seen in the previous two 
sections.  From Chapter III, Table 12 shows the costs that were projected in the awarded 
contract compared against the actual costs that were accrued by the Financial Analysis 
office:   
Initial Projected Contract Costs compared against Actual Obligations Incurred
FY01* FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total
Projected: 1,241,802$   3,570,300$   3,575,999$     3,575,999$   3,575,999$   15,540,100$   
Actual: 1,237,146$   3,628,830$   4,147,795$     4,979,256$   5,773,928$   19,766,955$   
Delta: 
(Projected - Actual)
 $        (4,656)  $       58,530  $       571,796  $  1,403,257  $  2,197,929  $    4,226,855 
Percent Over/Under -0.37% 1.64% 15.99% 39.24% 61.46% 27.20%
* Only includes the 2 months of transition in June and July, plus the 2 months of normal operations under the contract in 
August and September.  
Table 12.   Initial Projected Contract Costs compared against Actual Obligations Incurred 
 
The first period of time, the last four months of Fiscal Year 2001 (FY01), is the 
only period in which the actual contract costs came in under projections.  Interestingly, 
this was when the contract was new and had just been implemented.  Each of the 
following years showed progressively larger deviations from the costs initially projected, 
with the final tally showing the actual costs of the contract exceeded initial projections by 
more than 27%. 
a. Reasons for Contract Cost Growth 
By looking somewhat deeper into the contracting documents, there seems 
to be four areas that led to the future cost growth: changes in the definition of 
requirements, mandatory future pay increases not factored in original contract combined 
with the implementation of a collective bargaining agreement, payments for an incentive 
program, and the increased scope of operations due to the attacks on September 11, 2001.  
For a starting point of contract analysis, the actual contracting documents show increases 
by fiscal year in Table 13:  
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Changes by fiscal year to Initial Projected Contract Costs
FY01* FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total
Projected: 1,241,801.89$    3,570,300.26$    3,575,999.22$    3,575,999.22$    3,575,999.22$    15,540,099.81$    
Increases: (8,134.53)$          146,905.18$       1,002,365.66$    1,762,118.25$    2,285,971.62$    5,189,226.18$      
Revised Contract 
Cost:
 $   1,233,667.36  $   3,717,205.44  $   4,578,364.88  $    5,338,117.47  $    5,861,970.84  $    20,729,325.99 
Percent Increase in 
Contract: -0.66% 4.11% 28.03% 49.28% 63.93% 33.39%
* Only includes the 2 months of transition in June and July, plus the 2 months of normal operations under the contract in August and September.
 
Table 13.   Changes by fiscal year to Initial Projected Contract Costs 
 
b. Cost Growth Due to September 11 Attacks 
Given the period of time this contract was in effect, the initial reason most 
people would consider for cost increases would likely be the attacks on September 11, 
2001.  Surprisingly, of the four reasons mentioned above, the directly attributable cost 
increases due to the attacks was only $16,693.90.  This accounts for only 0.4% of the 
$5,189,226.18 negotiated contract cost increases and would not have been forecasted 
within the A-76 outsourcing competition.   
c. Cost Growth Due to Federal Incentive Program 
The next largest increase in the contract over the period of performance 
was due to a federally funded incentive program.  Particularly, starting in FY 03, the 
contractor either subcontracted or was supplied by an entity falling under the authority of 
the Indian Financing Act of 1974.  As a result of the subcontract or supplier, the 
contractor running the supply squadron was entitled to additional compensation under 
Section 504 of 25 U.S.C. 1544.  This entitlement under federal law caused the negotiated 
contract to increase by $187,499.52, or 3.6% of the total increases over the period of 
performance. 
d. Cost Growth Due to Defined Changes within Contract 
As may be expected, changes to the contract over time caused deviations 
from the original estimated costs.  Sometimes these changes were beneficial in that the 
government essentially obligated a larger amount of money than what the contractor 
ultimately billed.  This money was later deobligated and could be seen as cost savings for 
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the government.  Unfortunately, these deobligations did not outweigh the other changes 
within the contract that the government asked the contractor to perform.  Such things as 
Operational Readiness Inspection support, gas mask serviceability testing, and 
adjustments to the buildings available for use to the contractor ultimately led to a net cost 
of $341,776.65 to the government.  This represents 6.6% of the total increases over the 
period the contract was in effect.  Various changes to a contract, like the aforementioned 
examples, arise quite often and the government is nearly always going to be charged a fee 
for such changes. 
e. Cost Growth Due to Mandatory Wage Increases 
Up to this point only 10.6% of the cost increases over the period of the 
contract have been explained.  The final category of cost increases, mandatory pay 
increases, make up the remaining 89.4%.  This equates to $4,640,256.11 in increased 
costs over the period of the contract and a nearly 30% increase from the original contract.  
Analysis of the contracting documents shows that the Air Force had to incorporate, by 
law, wage increases each year as determined by the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Wage 
Determinations.  This was further exacerbated in FY03 when the contractor underwent a 
collective bargaining agreement, which dictated somewhat higher wages than simply 
those required by the DOL.  Based on the analysis of the proposed contract costs versus 
the  actual costs incurred, the Air Force only realized savings of $6,430,376 ($28,620,082 
- $19,766,955 - $2,422,751) when compared against the MEO estimate and factoring in 
the conversion differential in Section 1.  This figure is $3,136,253 less than the projected 
cost savings of $9,566,629, meaning that only 67.2% of the projected costs savings were 
realized.  The conclusion, based on these numbers, is that the Air Force did save money 
by outsourcing, but not nearly in the magnitude they had estimated.   
5. Weaknesses Discovered within the A-76 Competition Cost Estimates 
The idea that the Air Force did indeed save money by outsourcing via the A-76 
procedures may be even more questionable once the process itself is analyzed.  There are 
several key assumptions taken into account in order to calculate the comparable costs 
which may skew the results and over-inflate cost savings. 
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 By noting the wage increases in the contract which occurred year after year, the 
first disparity in comparing costs within the competition arises.  OMB Circular A-76 is 
very specific about ensuring inflation is factored into the MEO’s cost estimate.  
Attachment C of the Circular specifically states: “These annual pay raise assumptions and 
inflation factors shall be used in an agency or a public reimbursable cost estimate for pay 
and non-pay categories of cost…190”.  On the other hand, there is not nearly the emphasis 
in ensuring the contract proposal has inflationary factors for contract proposal wages 
included.  The Circular only alludes to inflation for wages to be included in the contract 
proposal in one paragraph stating:  
Inflation for wages and salaries of civilian positions and private sector 
service positions (often referred to as “labor escalation”) is included in 
private sector cost proposals, agency cost estimates, and public 
reimbursable cost estimates based on the solicitation requirements for 
economic price adjustment for labor inflation191.  
It is fairly obvious from the previous cost analysis of the contract that future wage 
increases due to inflation were not included.  This is particularly obvious by observing 
that each of the option years (FY02-FY05) have basically the same amount of funding 
required from year to year (the exception being FY02 which is slightly less than the 
others) with no obvious cost growth.  Getting into the MEO’s cost estimate, however, the 
estimated wages for federal employees included the inflation factors spelled out within 
the A-76 procedures.  Particular to this case, the lack of inflationary factors for the 
contract proposal’s wage structure puts it at a significant cost advantage over the MEO.  
The base year’s estimated annual personnel cost for the Air Force was $5,404,175.  If this 
cost was carried in a manner consistent with contract proposal’s apparent wage structure 
neglecting inflation, it would cause a restated MEO decrease of $1,710,112.  This would 
provide a new MEO estimate of $26,909,970 ($28,620,082 - $1,710,112) for use in the 
initial competition.  Actual cost savings are not changed since inflation has been taken 
into account above with the contract costs (after the fact) and compared to the originally 
inflated MEO costs.  
                                                 
190 Office of Management and Budget. Circular no. A-76, 1999. 
191 Office of Management and Budget. Circular no. A-76, 1999. 
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Another area found to over-inflate the MEO estimate involves casualty and 
liability insurance.  This disparity arises from the requirement for the contractor to have 
insurance to cover liabilities that may arise.  On the other hand, the federal government is 
self-insured and doesn’t actually pay for any insurance.  The MEO estimate, however, is 
required to have an estimate for insurance cost despite the fact that they will never have 
to pay insurance.  This self-insured aspect should be an inherent cost-saving measure for 
the MEO, but is not treated as such.  By not including the cost factor for insurance since 
it will never be a realized cost, the MEO estimate can be decreased by $346,602 to a 
figure of $26,563,368 ($26,909,970 - $346,602) and reduced cost savings of $6,083,774 
($6,430,376 - $346,602).  By factoring in these other relevant costs, it still remains that 
the Air Force did save funds over their estimated MEO cost estimate, but certainly not to 
the degree initially projected. 
B. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT ARRANGEMENT 
1. Introduction 
To analyze the contract arrangement, we will examine the types of contract risk 
and how to determine contract risk that were set forth in Section C of Chapter II and 
apply them to the supply contract.   
2. Types of Risk 
a. Strategic Risks 
Strategic risks are associated with the decision of whether or not to 
outsource a function.  The three specific risks we will analyze are the outsourcing of core 
competencies, loss of flexibility, and opportunistic behavior. 
(1)  Outsourcing of Core Competencies.  The DoD Senior 
Executive Council defines a military core competency as “a complex harmonization of 
individual technologies and production skills that create unique military capabilities 
valued by the force employing [commander in chief]”192.  According to the Council, a 
core competency has potential application to a wide variety of national security needs, 
provides a significant contribution to the combatant commander’s desired effect, would 
                                                 
192 United States General Accounting Office, and United States. Dept. of Defense. Defense 
Management: DOD Faces Challenges Implementing its Core Competency Approach and A-76 
Competitions. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 
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be difficult for competitors to imitate, provides the means to differentiate from 
competitors, crosses organizational boundaries within an enterprise, is a direct contributor 
to the perceived value of the service, does not diminish with use, deploys with forces, and 
provides training and experience that forms the basis of ethos and culture193.  
Based upon this definition, we would not consider the supply 
function to be a core competency of the military.  Similar supply functions are carried out 
by every large organization, thus keeping it from being a unique military capability.  In 
addition, the supply function is easily imitated by competitors, does not provide the 
means to differentiate from competitors, and is not a direct contributor to the perceived 
value of the service.  Since the supply function is not a core competency, it is an 
appropriate function to outsource. 
(2)  Loss of Flexibility.  The base commander certainly lost 
flexibility when the base outsourced its supply function.  Instead of military and 
government civilian workers who could be directly supervised and directed, the function 
is now performed by contractor employees.  These employees are supervised by the 
contractor and do not interact directly with government leadership.  Instead, government 
leadership communicates to the contracting officer who, in turn, communicates with the 
contractor’s management team.  Any communications between the contractor’s 
management team and their employees is at the discretion of the contractor.  In addition, 
the contractor is only bound to perform the work listed in the contract.  Any changes need 
to be negotiated with the contractor through the contracting officer.  This not only 
requires time to perform, but can also increase cost if the contractor can reasonably claim 
that they will incur additional expenses to incorporate the changes.  
This roundabout communication and the loss of direct supervision 
over the employees performing the work adds extra layers of bureaucracy and slows 
down the decision making process.  However, the supply function is a relatively steady 
function and does not have a lot of variability.  The only major changes in the day-to-day 
                                                 
193 United States General Accounting Office, and United States. Dept. of Defense. Defense 
Management: DOD Faces Challenges Implementing its Core Competency Approach and A-76 
Competitions. Washington, D.C: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003. 
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operations would occur under a contingency operation.  As long as contingency 
operations are addressed in the contract, the lost of flexibility should not have a 
substantial impact on the base supply operations. 
(3)  Opportunistic Behavior.  The chances for opportunistic 
behavior are relatively low for this contract.  There are numerous other companies that 
could perform the required functions.  Furthermore, the contract is just over four years in 
duration with options every year.  This means that the contractor knows that they will 
have to perform well or the contract will not be renewed and another contractor will take 
their place.   
b. Operational Risks 
Operational risks are not associated with the decision of whether to 
outsource a function, but rather the decision of how the function will be outsourced194. 
(1)  Packaging of Requirements.  The leadership at the Air Force 
Base decided to outsource the entire supply function into one contract.  This seems to be 
a good packaging of requirements.  Combining multiple bases that are not collocated with 
one another seems to be too broad of a scope for a single contract.  At the same time, 
breaking the supply function apart into its sub-functions to be performed by multiple 
contractors would have led to higher coordination costs that would not have been worth 
the effort.   
(2)  Insufficient SOW/PWS/QASP.  We were not able to review 
the QASP that was used for this contract and the contracting office chose to use a SOW 
in lieu of a PWS.  Overall the SOW was well written and addressed the work that needed 
to be performed.  It provided a good overview of the functions to be performed, provided 
a detailed break-down of all the tasks as well as historical data of the workload, provided 
minimum levels of service for each task, and addressed how the contractor must handle 
contingency operations.   
                                                 
194 Chad M. Brooks, Edward J. White, and David E. Moore. Outsourcing Options to Meet Navy 
Recapitalization Goals. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. Monterey, California. 
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However, there were two areas that could have been improved.  
The first is that there was not a sufficient penalty for not meeting the minimum level of 
service for a task.  Since the contract was fixed price with no incentive fees, the penalty 
was the issuance of a Contractor Discrepancy Report (CDR) by the contracting officer.  
While CDR’s are certainly a deterrent to poor performance, immediate fiscal penalties 
would probably have been more effective.   
The second area for improvement was contingency operations.  
The paragraph addressing contingency operations was intentionally vague to allow 
flexibility for unknown possible future requirements.  However, the pay structure was not 
very clear or adequate.  In the description paragraph the SOW stated that any work 
performed for contingency operations would be included as part of the fixed price 
contract.  This seems unreasonable since the cost of contingency operations could be very 
high and the contractor has no way to budget for it in their proposal.  Instead, the 
contingency operations Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) should have been funded 
separately as cost-reimbursable.  Then, in a later paragraph, the SOW stated that the 
contractor could submit their costs incurred under contingency operations for review and 
that the contracting officer could authorize reimbursement at their discretion.  These 
seemingly contradictory statements create questions as to whether or not contingency 
operations would increase the cost of the contract.   
(3)  Quality and Type of Contract.  As was stated in Chapter II, 
inappropriate or poorly written contracts can expose the agency to a high risk of 
interrupted service, poor quality, and cost growth195.  To minimize these risks, contracts 
should clearly state service levels and measurements, penalties for non-performance, 
growth and inflation rates, and termination provisions196.  If applicable, they should also 
address potential contingency situations to eliminate the costly and time-consuming 
contract modifications that would result if the contingency were to occur. 
                                                 
195 Chad M. Brooks, Edward J. White, and David E. Moore. Outsourcing Options to Meet Navy 
Recapitalization Goals. Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. Monterey, California. 
196 Christopher Lonsdale. “Outsourcing: A Business Guide to Risk Management Tools and 
Techniques.” March (1998).  
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The contract followed most of these suggestions.  It clearly stated 
the required service levels and measurements, penalties for non-performance, termination 
provisions, and contingency situations.  In addition, a fixed-price contract was used 
which is the preferred type for well-defined, routine, and recurring service. 
The one area that was lacking was the growth and inflation rates.  
As can be seen in Table 5 in Chapter III, the contractor bid the same amount 
($3,575,999.22) in FY03, FY04, and FY05.  This lack of anticipated cost growth 
certainly contributed to the contract not meeting the original cost projections.  
(4)  Length of Contract.  The total contract duration was five years 
and two months.  This included a two-month transition period, a base year, and four 
option years.  This is a good length for a service contract because it keeps the contracting 
office from having to re-compete the contract every year or two and allows the contractor 
a chance to settle in and move along a learning curve.  At the same time, it does not lock 
the base into too long of contract in which the contractor could exhibit opportunistic 
behavior.  In addition, the inclusion of option years gives the base the flexibility to cancel 
the contract and re-compete the contract if they so desire.  In theory this keeps the 
contractor from becoming complacent and letting quality and cost control decline. 
(5)  Insufficient Resources to Manage Contract.  We do not have 
the data necessary to make a determination as to whether or not the base devoted enough 
resources to adequately manage this contract.  However, based on the increased workload 
in the acquisition community mentioned in Section E of Chapter II and the problems with 
the contracts mentioned in Section F of Chapter II, we can make an educated deduction 
that there probably was not. 
C. APPARENT STRENGTHS AND BENEFITS OF THIS A-76 
COMPETITION 
1. Short-Term Governmental Cost Savings 
The first apparent benefit to the Air Force from an outsourced the supply 
squadron through this A-76 competition is the apparent cost savings.  While cost savings 
occurred, as compared to the MEO, they were not as great in magnitude as desired.  It is 
also apparent that as the contract progressed, cost savings diminished greatly over the 
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years.  If this trend continues into the future, the Air Force will likely achieve increased 
costs over the long run outweighing the gains captured in the short-term putting increased 
stress on the discretionary portions of the Wing’s overall budget. 
2. Provides Incentive to Other Organizations to Cut Costs 
By outsourcing the supply squadron through the A-76 process, there may have 
been the effect of opening the eyes of other non-inherently governmental positions to the 
danger of potentially being outsourced.  With the fear of losing a job, or the decreased 
flexibility posed by non-contracted functions, units may be more aware of their costs.  
This increased awareness to the costs of an organization should motivate cost reductions 
in order to not be noticed for potential A-76 competition, and if competed, be more 
competitive in the process.   
3. Active Duty Military Reassigned to Areas More Critical to National 
Defense 
Due to military personnel remaining on active duty and being reassigned 
elsewhere after an outsourcing competition, national defense gains personnel that can be 
better utilized in more critical areas.  Instead of having potential war fighting resources 
tied up dealing with a logistics tail, personnel are able to be moved into areas that are 
potentially short-manned, overstressed, and closer to the tip of the spear in responding to 
military contingencies.  Overall, this provides more military manpower and options for 
combatant commanders. 
D. APPARENT WEAKNESSES AND DEFICIENCIES OF THIS A-76 
COMPETITION 
1. Competition Done on “Best Cost” versus a “Best Value” Basis 
The outsourcing process, as currently dictated by the A-76, simply looks at the 
costs of an organization versus what a contractor claims their costs will be to run the 
same operations.  While this provides a simple approach to the idea of how to save 
government funds, it does not necessarily compare the intangibles brought by either 
source of labor.  A contractor may specialize in supply chain management, which can 
provide them a distinct advantage over the government and gain significant efficiencies  
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because of it.  On the other hand, a military or civilian employee with years of experience 
cannot be simply replaced with a new person and have a continued level of expertise in 
dealing with the bureaucracy of the federal government. 
2. Poor Cost Estimates for the Contract to be Compared against the 
MEO 
There are some areas of the A-76 competition itself that do not necessarily 
provide for comparisons of like costs.  If both cost estimates are not treated in a similar 
manner, specifically in terms of the effects of inflation on wages, it distorts the two 
comparisons.  Likewise, if a cost such as insurance for the government is artificial with 
no chance of ever actually being incurred, it should not be considered as a cost to the 
government.  The ideal comparison of costs should be what is truly likely to be incurred 
by either party over the term of the performance. 
3. Opportunity Costs Are Never Factored in the Competition 
While difficult to quantify, opportunity costs are never factored into the process 
for the competition.  Particularly, the source selection process is a tedious one by design 
in order to hopefully obtain a well written and fair contract; however, the time it takes to 
perform a proper source selection is time taken away from oversight of contracts already 
in place or meeting the immediate contracting needs for the base.  This problem is further 
exacerbated if a contracting squadron is short-handed due to the current worldwide 
deployments of various military contracting personnel.  Furthermore, increased contract 
costs over the years are required to be paid, which at times takes funding away from other 
priorities and projects of the base in order to ensure the contractor is paid.  Many times, 
these other priorities and projects are delayed indefinitely, or when funded, cause a spike 
in workload on the personnel responsible for executing the project. 
4. Loss of Flexibility to the Air Force 
Outsourcing causes a loss of flexibility to the Air Force.  With military personnel, 
a wing commander can simply ask, and likely get, military personnel to work overtime 
with no additional costs due to their salary nature.  Government civilians may also be 
easily asked to work overtime and will likely oblige, albeit at a cost of time-and-a-half 
their pay rate or compensation time.  Contractors, on the other hand, are not required to  
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work any more than what is dictated in the contract.  If increased work is required and is 
not set forth in the contract, it will cause significantly higher costs to modify the contract 
in order to provide the necessary services. 
5. No Method Available to Retract What Has Been Done if Long-Term 
Costs Become Unfavorable 
Once an A-76 competition is complete, either the contractor or MEO basically 
become the standard.  If there are increased costs in the future, it is very unlikely the 
government will be able to revert back to the status quo which existed prior to the A-76 
competition.  In other words, there doesn’t appear to be a method to determine if it would 
be more cost beneficial to the government to change back to the way operations were run 
in the past. 
6. Cost of Military Members Remaining on Active Duty Not Considered  
The costs associated with military members remaining on active duty are not 
reflected within the data for the competition.  From Chapter II, it is reasonable to estimate 
that military members are replaced by 0.6 civilian employees when considering the MEO 
portion of an A-76 competition.  Meanwhile, the military members are reassigned to 
other areas of the military, in this case the Air Force, upon award of the competition to 
either the MEO or contractor.  As an illustration, assume a unit of 100 military members 
is being studied for outsourcing.  If this unit will be replaced by 60 civilians, the military 
members go elsewhere and the civilians run the operations of the unit.  Costs overall will 
increase because there are now 160 total people on the roster of the government instead 
of the original 100 military.  Similarly, if a contractor wins the competition with half of 
the manpower the MEO had, 30, there will be increased costs overall due to the increase 
in personnel to 130 people overall.  Either way, as long as military members remain in 
the military upon an awarding of an A-76 competition, there will be overall increased 
costs. 
7. A-76 Study Costs Savings May Be Better Suited for Units Entirely 
Composed of Civilians 
Because of the issues with military member costs actually remaining on the books 
after outsourcing and the assumptions made in determining the number of civilians to fill 
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those positions, the A-76 competition process may be a better fit for organizations 
already comprised of 100% civilian workforce.  In essence, this organization should be 
setup as an MEO already and will allow a more accurate and fair comparison to a 
contractor’s proposal and give a better idea of true cost savings realized.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
   While it appears from our analysis that the Air Force did save money from 
outsourcing the supply squadron as compared to the MEO in the A-76 competition, the 
magnitude of cost savings was never realized from those anticipated.  In the comparison 
of historical data, analysis shows that the Air Force may have actually saved more money 
by having left the supply squadron to operate as it already was structured.  This is 
especially true when military member costs are considered to still exist somewhere else 
in the Air Force.  Flexibility to the Air Force is lost by going to a contractor operated unit 
and may also cause a significant strain on the Wing’s budget as they cut other areas’ 
funding throughout the base in order to pay the legally binding bill of a contract.  
Meanwhile, other operations or infrastructure of the base may deteriorate as a result of 
decreased necessary funding.   
 Conclusions found through the analysis of this particular Air Force supply 
squadron outsourcing process are highlighted against the previous findings of others as 
discussed in Chapter II in Table 14: 
 
Summary of Findings 
Strengths: Relationship to findings covered in Chapter II: 
1.  Short-term Governmental Cost 
Savings 
“Risks of Outsourcing: Introduction,” page 18 
2.  Provides incentive to other 
organizations to cut costs 
“More Efficient and Better Performing 
Organizations,” page 14 
3.  Active duty military reassigned 
to areas more critical to national 
defense 
“Warfighting,” page 13 
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Weaknesses: Relationship to findings covered in Chapter II: 
1.  Competition done on “Best 
Cost” versus a “Best Value” Basis 
“Lowest Cost Versus Best Value,” page 50 
2.  Poor Cost Estimates for the 
Contract to be compared against 
the MEO 
“Poor Cost Estimates,” page 48 
3.  Opportunity Costs are never 
factored in the competition 
“Risks of Outsourcing: Introduction,” page 18 
4.  Loss of flexibility to the Air 
Force 
“Strategic Risks: Loss of Flexibility,” page 20 
5.  No method available to retract 
what has been done if long-term 
costs become unfavorable 
“Strategic Risks: Opportunistic Behavior,” page 20 
6.  Cost of Military members 
remaining on active duty not 
considered 
“Transfer of Costs,” Page 32 
7.  A-76 study costs savings may 
be better suited for units entirely 
composed of civilians 
“Transfer of Costs,” Page 32 
Table 14.   Summary of Findings  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BETTER COST ANALYSIS 
 Based upon the insights gained from the preceding analysis, it is recommended 
that comparable costs between the MEO and the contract proposal be based upon the real 
likelihood of their occurrence.  In other words, costs that the government will in all 
likelihood incur should be included, such as future predicted wage increases for the 
personnel.  On the other hand, since the government is self-insured, there should be no 
requirement for an insurance cost calculation because the self-insured nature can be seen 
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as an inherent benefit to maintaining government run operations.  In terms of the 
contractor, since contracts are mandated by law to maintain equity in wages according to 
DOL wage determinations, future increases in wages should be estimated within the 
contract proposal’s cost.  The notion of a fair competition will be kept to a higher level of 
fairness by being realistic with costs which are likely be incurred over the period being 
studied rather than by setting somewhat arbitrary rules to provide an unrealistic sense of 
fairness. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BETTER CONTRACTING METHODS 
 Despite the fact that this contract was fixed-price and did not have a significant 
increase in workload, the cost of the contract increased 138%.  This suggests that the use 
of equitable adjustments to cover increased contractor costs may have been too liberal.  
Contracting Officers awarding future contracts of this nature may want to use a fixed-
price plus incentive fee or cost plus incentive fee contract to provide a stronger incentive 
for the contractor to control costs.      
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Further Analysis of Completed Competitions and Period of 
Performance 
This is a study of only one particular A-76 competition.  Similar analyses should 
be performed to determine if the same or similar conclusions can be drawn.  In particular, 
for this study one supply squadron out of nearly all of the Air Force’s supply 
restructuring was analyzed.  Most supply operations within the Air Force are now 
conducted by contractors with the A-76 process having been the mode of setting them in 
place.  These other outsourced operations should provide ample opportunity to be 
analyzed after-the-fact.  Furthermore, operations other than the supply functions have 
been outsourced within the Air Force and should be available for analysis as well.   
2. Feasibility of Centralized A-76 Competition Operations 
Keeping in mind that each base is responsible for conducting its own competition, 
it may be a better process to have a team set up at a higher level responsible for 
conducting A-76 competitions.  In particular, it is suggested that the feasibility of each 
major command (MAJCOM) having an office set up to directly deal with A-76 
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competitions for the various bases and units falling under their structure be studied.  This 
more centralized process would allow personnel at each subordinate base to identify areas 
with potential to be outsourced and obtain the information to do the study.  The 
MAJCOM can then do the analysis as a somewhat more disinterested party made up with 
individuals who deal solely and thereby specialize in A-76 competitions.  These 
individuals would bring a steady stream of expertise to the process and ensure that 
competitions are accomplished in as fair and consistent of a manner as possible.  Also, 
their continued presence with the A-76 process should be able to more clearly identify 
potential areas for improvement in the fairness of costing methods and overall process of 
accomplishing the competition. 
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VI. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
A. WHERE TO GET INFORMATION 
 In order to obtain the information to do an analysis similar to this one, there are 
four main offices to be contacted for raw data.  The budget office of the Comptroller 
Squadron (office symbol CPTS/FMA) has all of the raw obligation data, historic and 
present, for each unit within a base.  The Contracting Squadron (office symbol CONS) is 
the office which will have access to all of the contracting documents with their 
modifications.  The Manpower Office of the Mission Support Squadron (office symbol 
MSS/MO) will have the information from the actual A-76 competition itself.  Finally, the 
most recently released inflation factors for normalizing data to a constant year can be 
obtained through the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Cost 
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